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ABSTRACT 
On the 21st March 2018, leaders from across the African continent met at an extraordinary summit 
of the African Union (AU) in Kigali, Rwanda to sign a deal for the formation of an African 
continental free trade area (AfCFTA). This step is perhaps the biggest leap towards the age-long 
dream of cross-border economic integration on the African continent since the formation of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. With the continent’s population expected to hit the 
two billion mark in 2050, it seems the pact could not have come at a better time. 
Africa, the subject of the agreement, consists of fifty- five States which collectively, is a 1.2 billion 
people large market however possessing a joint GDP of only $2.5 trillion dollars. If negotiations 
are concluded, the African continent would have succeeded in the creation of the largest free trade 
area since the Marrakesh agreement which led to the WTO governed multilateral trading system. 
Today the top trading partners of African Union member States are non-African countries. Only 
twenty per cent of Africa’s total trade is with its continental neighbours, whereas an estimated 
eighty per cent of its trade is with other trading partners across the world. The African continental 
free trade initiative aims to shift the trade paradigm in this regard, in a way that will increase the 
region’s share of its internal trade and consequently lead to growth and development. 
It is against this background that this work assesses the prospects of the new African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) towards meeting the goal of continental development. This research 
argues that the development integration approach is the most suitable option for the attainment of 
the ambitious goals of the initiative. In particular, the work explores the ways in which the new 
AfCFTA can manage the asymmetrical developmental needs of various African States. The 
research also assesses the dispute settlement mechanisms which are necessary to resolve friction 
which may arise as deeper levels of integration are attained. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
"Our peoples, our business community and our youth, in particular, cannot wait 
any longer to see the lifting of the barriers that divide our continent, hinder its 
economic takeoff and perpetuate misery, even though Africa is abundantly 
endowed with wealth," 1 
- AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat.  
 
On the 21st March 2018, leaders from across the African continent met at an extraordinary summit 
of the African Union (AU) in Kigali, Rwanda to sign a deal for the formation of an African 
continental free trade area.2 This step is perhaps the biggest leap towards the age-long dream of 
cross-border economic integration on the African continent since the formation of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. With the continent’s population expected to hit the two billion 
mark in 2050, 3 it seems the pact could not have come at a better time. 
Negotiations leading up to the historic signing of the agreement on the African continental free 
trade area, were launched officially on the 15th of June, 2015 at the 25th ordinary summit of heads 
of States and governments held in Johannesburg, South Africa,4 and commenced with ambitious 
aspirations. The aspirations included inclusive growth and sustainable development, integration 
on a scale that will be expressive of pan-Africanist ideals and visions of an African renaissance, 
as well as the hope of increasing the continent’s intra-African trade levels from less than twenty 
percent today to above fifty percent by the year 2063.5  
                                                           
1 Aljazeera ‘African leaders sign continental free-trade agreement’ available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/african-leaders-sign-continental-free-trade-agreement-
180320180017027.html, accessed on 31 March 2018. 
2 Representatives of 44 of the 55 African Union (AU) member states attended the events. Notably absent was the 
Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, who stated that Nigeria had chosen to abstain because it needed more time 
for ‘broader consultations. 
3 UNECA ‘African Continental Free trade Area. Question & Answers’ (2018) available at  
https://www.uneca.org/publications/african-continental-free-trade-area-questions-answers accessed on 25 May 
2018.  
4 Trade Law Centre ‘African Continental Free trade Area (AfCFTA). FAQs. Question & Answers’ (2018) 1 available 
at https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/faqs/2019-african-continental-free-trade-area-faqs-june-2018-
1/file.html accessed on 25 May 2018.  
5 Brendan Vickers, ‘Handbook on Regional Integration in Africa- Towards Agenda 2063’ (2017). See also Nwaodu 
Okechukwu & Ijeoma Chikata, ‘The African Union Continental Free Trade Area: Challenges and Prospects’ (2018) 
International Journal of Sustainable Development Research. 4(2) 36-43.  
 2 
Africa, the subject of the agreement, consists of fifty- five States which collectively, is a 1.2 billion 
people large market possessing a joint GDP of $2.5 trillion dollars. If negotiations are concluded, 
the African continent would have succeeded in the creation of the largest free trade area since the 
Marrakesh agreement which led to the WTO governed multilateral trading system.6 Today the top 
trading partners of African Union member States are non-African countries.7 Only twenty per cent 
of Africa’s total trade is with its continental neighbours, whereas an estimated eighty per cent of 
its trade is with other trading partners across the world. A survey of the trade indices of Africa’s 
largest economies, Nigeria and South Africa, reflects similar statistics. In 2017, about $35 billion 
worth of Nigeria’s exports and $20 billion of its imports were to and from non-African countries 
respectively, accounting for about 87.9 % of its total trade.8 In the case of South Africa, about $65 
billion of its export trade and $74.5 billion of its imports, were to and from non-African countries 
accounting for about 89.7% its imports and 73.7% of its export trade. These skewed indices which 
have persisted over time raises concerns about whether Africa has done enough trade-wise to raise 
itself from the abyss of under-development.9  
The African continental free trade initiative aims to shift the trade paradigm in this regard, in a 
way that will increase the region’s share of its internal trade and consequently lead to even growth 
and development. In an expression of this objective, the initiative contains inter alia, a framework 
for the reduction of tariff barriers to trade on ninety per cent of goods, followed by the other ten 
per cent dubbed as ‘sensitive goods’10 It also contains commitments towards the liberalisation of 
trade in services, as well as the free movement of people. 11 It is therefore not surprising that the 
agreement is regarded as the single most ambitious expression of Africa’s attempt at actualising 
                                                           
6 The Marrakesh agreement was instrumental to the formation of the WTO in 1995. 
7 World Integrated Trade Solutions ‘Sub-Saharan Africa Trade at Glance: Most Recent Values’ available at 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/SSF/textview accessed 1 April 2018. 
8 International Monetary Fund ‘World Economic Outlook Database (GDP based on Purchasing Power Parity)’ 
available at https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/SSF/textview accessed on 19 April 2018. 
9 Ibid. Without prejudice to the fact that the statistics are an improvement on the intra-African trade relations which 
existed about a decade ago, it still leaves much to be desired. 
10 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Modalities for tariff negotiations towards a Continental 
Free trade Area some key issues for consideration’ available at 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditc2015misc3_en.pdf accessed on 18 July 2018. 
11 Mkandawire Thandika, ‘African Intellectuals. Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development’ ed (2005). 
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the aspirations of its pan-African ‘heroes past’ in terms of unity and integration.12  
It is against this background that this work assesses the prospects of the African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA) towards meeting the goal of continental development. This research argues 
that the development integration approach is the most suitable option for the attainment of the 
ambitious goals of the initiative. In particular, the work explores the ways in which the AfCFTA 
can manage the asymmetrical developmental needs of various African States. The research also 
assesses the dispute settlement mechanisms which are necessary to resolve friction which may 
arise as deeper levels of integration are attained. 
1.1. Research question 
In the light of the above mentioned issues, the research question therefore is: what lessons can be 
drawn from the regional integration efforts in Africa for further negotiations and success of the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)? 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
Against the backdrop of the central theme of this research, the aims of this study are four-fold.  
First, the study aims to examine the theory of regional integration generally, as well as its models 
and approaches which are significant to this study. Secondly, the study also evaluates the historical 
context behind the current integration efforts in Africa. It is envisaged, that it will aid a better 
appreciation of the central theme of this dissertation and its significance for the continent. Thirdly, 
aspects of the legal and institutional framework for the AfCFTA are examined. 
Finally, the dispute settlement system created by the AfCFTA is evaluated against the backdrop 
of the dispute settlement experience of regional Courts in Africa. In this regard, an assessment is 
made of the compliance and enforcement preparedness of the AfCFTA dispute settlement system. 
 
 
                                                           
12 Faizel Ismail, ‘Transformative industrialization and trade in the context of the CFTA: opportunities and challenges 
(2018) 7. 
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1.3 Structure of Research and Research Methodology 
The research employs a doctrinal methodology consisting of an examination of primary and 
secondary sources. While the primary sources include case law, treaties and official documents of 
key institutions and stakeholders involved in the process, the secondary sources comprise of books, 
journals, newspaper articles, conference papers, working papers and relevant internet sources. 
This research is structured into five chapters as follows: 
Chapter one provides a theoretical framework for the discourse. In it, the introduction to and 
background of the discourse is set out. The aim of the first chapter is to establish the foundation 
for the study by discussing the concept of regional integration. In this regard, the chapter considers 
the general theories and models of regional integration.  
Chapter two embarks on a historical assessment of Africa’s efforts on regional integration. This 
assessment is made against the backdrop of a theoretical categorization of the approaches to 
African integration, as well as the various frameworks for integration from the 1980s and 1990s. 
The integration initiatives of the new millennium, which was marked significantly by the 
formation of the African Union, is examined here especially within the context of specific 
initiatives that are significant to the central discourse of this study.  
While chapter three delves into the crux of this dissertation the African Continental Free Trade 
Area, and considers its imperatives, projected gains for the continent as well as the legal and 
institutional framework in place for it, chapter four discusses the dispute settlement system under 
the AfCFTA. Chapter four is key because disputes are bound to arise in the free trade area and if 
improperly managed may prove to be fatal to the initiative.  This chapter also provides insight into 
the pervasive issue of compliance and enforcement of regional economic communities, which 
could easily compromise the efficient management of disputes which arises between actors under 
the AfCFTA. 
Finally, chapter five summarizes the entire research and makes recommendations.  
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1.4 Regional Integration: A Conceptual and theoretical analysis 
The March 2018 Rwanda agreement which launched the continental free trade area marks a very 
significant step as far as African integration is concerned. It has consequently generated a myriad 
of discussions on the concept across many sectors including labour, business and among scholars 
and researchers. From Cape Town to Cairo, and Lagos to Nairobi, and to other parts of the African 
continent, Africans are questioning the underlying idea behind the Continental Free Trade 
Agreement. This segment discusses the theories of regional integration within which the concept 
of a free trade area is located. 
Over the years, the concept of regional integration has lent itself to multi-disciplinary research. 
Most of the research points to the politics of international diplomacy post World War II as the 
historical roots of integration as a concept in its modern context.13 Some scholars argue for 
integration to be understood as an expression of the dynamics of the international political 
relationships between States.14 Fagbayibo, explains that this phenomenon was especially prompted 
by the realisation amongst States that certain domestic functions (as well as objectives) are 
transcendental and too multifaceted to be handled by them alone, therefore lending credence to a 
governance framework which involved the need for strategic partnerships with non-State actors.15 
It must be stated, that integration is a process which varies in scope and application. A leading 
authority on international relations theory regarded as the founder of neo-functionalism, Ernst B 
Haas, defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national States. The 
end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over 
the pre-existing ones.”16 This definition focuses on the political angle to integration, which 
involves conscious political steps taken by decision-making institutions in a State, leading to a 
                                                           
13  Nam-Kook Kim, ‘Globalization and Regional Integration in Europe and Asia’ (2009). See also Paolo Giordano & 
Robert Devlin, ‘Regional Integration’ (2012). Haas Ernst, ‘The study of regional integration: Reflections on the joy 
and anguish of pretheorising’. (1970) 610. 
14 Peter Hay, ‘Federalism and supranational organisation: Patterns of new legal structure’ (1966) 1-2. 
15 Biodun O Fagbayibo, ‘A politico-legal framework for integration in Africa: Exploring the attainability of a 
supranational African Union’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2010) 16. 
16 Ernst B Haas, ‘The uniting of Europe: Political, social and economic forces’ (1958) 15-16 
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functional shift in loyalties as well as expectations towards a new supranational entity, ultimately 
birthing a new political community.  
From an economics point of view, British economist and pioneer of the new economic geography, 
Anthony Venables, explains that integration ‘occurs when countries come together to form free 
trade areas or customs union, offering members preferential trade access to each other’s markets’.17 
His definition focuses on market access and trade as the main intentions of integration. A key aim 
of regional integration is the provision of economic gains such as job creation and economies of 
scale for States.  
From a legal point of view, integration is first a product of law before it is anything else.18 Legal 
scholars in trying to contextualise the concept of integration, conclude that it involves a continuous 
progression of treaties and agreements, spelling out rights as well as obligations, and binding 
nation States to commitments intended to be beneficial to all of them. The legal framework for 
regional integration is more centred on the efficacy of treaty provisions and their implications for 
States who accede to them. It also focuses on the status of regional bodies under international law 
and the legal effects of laws they produce.19 
According to Cantori & Spiegel, integration involves political unification predicated by 
similarities and complementarities between the parties involved.20 This definition presupposes an 
element of sameness in tradition, economic ideology and political goals.21 This is largely true of 
the attempts at integration in most areas of the world. From the African experience, similarities in 
tradition, economic ideology, political goals and geography have played major roles in regional 
decisions to integrate. Sam Asante defines the process as one in which two or more countries in a 
particular area voluntarily unite to pursue common objectives in matters of general economic 
                                                           
17 Anthony Venables, ‘International trade: Regional economic integration’ (2000) International Encyclopaedia of 
Social and Behavioural Sciences (2000) 1. 
18 Joseph Weiler, ‘The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor? And other essays on 
European integration’. eds (1999) 221. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Louis Cantori, & Steven Spiegel, ‘The international politics of regions – A comparative approach’ (1970) 10-11. 
21 Fagbayibo op cit note 5 at 18 
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development or in a particular economic field of common interests to the mutual advantage of all 
the participating States.22 
The above-mentioned definitions of integration show that it is not one without technicalities. It 
can be described as a multi-layered process, which could become very complicated by political, 
legal, economic and even cultural concerns, as it attempts to reach its unique objective in a 
particular region, especially if not properly understood within that context. It is therefore 
imperative to not consider integration as a ‘big-bang’ occurrence, but rather as a process which 
happens gradually over a length of time, an approach which must take cognizance of the political, 
legal, economic and the cultural peculiarities of the parties involved.23 
At this point, it is important to draw a distinction between regional integration and regional 
cooperation. Regional cooperation “is a collaborative venture between two or more partners, with 
common interests in a given issue.”24 Regional cooperation is often a precursor to regional 
integration. Haarlow provides insightful examples on the kinds of ventures which may be 
considered as areas of cooperation, such as, the execution of joint projects, technical sector 
cooperation, common running of services and policy harmonization, joint development of common 
natural resources, joint stand towards the rest of the world and joint promotion of production.25 
Schmitter argues that States find it more tactful to engage first in cooperation, in order to build up 
mutual trust among elites and sufficient interdependencies among broader publics, before plunging 
into the much riskier (and potentially rewarding) business of integration.26 This insight is reflected 
in the next chapter of this research which shows that African States were inclined to cooperate first 
to deal with the intricate dynamics of the post-independence tsunami of Statehood before 
considering the integration option. It should be noted that these areas of cooperation stated above 
are by no means exhaustive but provide broad examples of areas of collaboration. 
 
                                                           
22 Sam K.B. Asante, ‘Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality, and Challenges’ (1997) 20.  
23 Fagbayibo op cit note 5 at 19 
24 Naceur Bourenane, ‘Theoretic and Strategic Approaches’ in Réal Lavergne (ed) Regional Integration and 
Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective (1997) 50-51. See also Margaret Lee ‘Regionalism in 
Africa: A part of problem or a part of Solution’ (2002) 9 Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. 3. 
25 Jens Haarlow, ‘Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in Southern Africa: General 
Approaches, SADCC and the World Bank’ 1997 Aldershot: Averbury 16. In; Lee op cit note 21 at 4 
26 Philippe C Schmitter, ‘Regional Cooperation and Region Integration: Concepts, Measurements and a bit of Theory’ 
(2007) 8. 
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1.5 Theories of Regional integration 
The concept of integration has found appeal in virtually all areas of the world. Since the end of the 
Second World War, the international community has continuously witnessed an increase (often 
described as a proliferation) in attempts at integration. This trend especially increased after the 
Marrakesh agreement (which preceded and formed the WTO), came in to force. Today, the WTO 
has recorded about 449 attempts at integration post 1994, marking therefore, an exponential 
increase in the number of attempts at integration.27 The various experiments at integration across 
the world have consequently provided avenues for increased multidisciplinary research. Theorists 
from various disciplines have therefore made attempts at propounding various theories on it based 
on their perceptions of its formation and effects as well as how its practice has evolved around the 
world, but especially in Europe. The next segment discusses theories from the fields of 
international relations, political science, law and economics. 
1.5.1 Political and International Relations theories on integration: 
The political theories on integration could be analysed across two broad spectra. The first being 
within the context of supra-nationalism which argues for the assignment of sovereignty to a 
transnational entity, devoid of the frailties, imperfections and limitations of nation States.2829 The 
second spectrum for the analysis of integration within the context of politics and international 
relations is the State-centric or intergovernmental school of thought. This school argues that 
notwithstanding the development of transnational or supra-national entities, a nation State will 
remain dominant and relevant to the decision making on global affairs.30 
The functionalist perspective is another specific school on integration which, has leanings to 
politics and international relations. It falls under the broad theory of supra-nationalism which arose 
against the backdrop of the disastrous impact of World War I and II. Functionalism advocates for 
the creation of specialized technocratic institutions through integration which will take charge of 
the transnational socio-economic and public welfare issues of the society.31 This theory predicts 
                                                           
27 Olasupo Owoeye, ‘Regionalism and WTO Multilateralism: The Case for an African Continental Free Trade Area’ 
(2016) Kluwer Law International 1085-1109. 
28 This theory questions the idea behind statehood in the wake of the deadliest wars in the history of humanity, World 
War 1 and 2, and the utter failure of the nation State to prevent the near annihilation of humanity. 
29 Fagbayibo op cit note 13 at 75 
30 Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, ‘International institutional law: Unity within diversity’ 3 ed (1995) 40. 
31 David Mitrany, ‘The Functional theory of politics’ (1975) 126. 
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that in the aftermath of the creation of this technocratic body will come attitudinal changes marked 
by a shift in loyalties from nation States to the bodies created. A key proponent of this school is 
political theorist, David Mitrany, who argued that the functional and technocratic agencies will be 
different from the normal international organisations in the sense that they will be detached and 
unaffiliated from individual nation States and have autonomous tasks and powers.32 The 
functionalist theory is however criticized for lacking an empirical basis and ignoring the highly 
political nature of international relations. 
Reacting to the shortcomings of the functionalist school of thought is yet another political science-
based theory of integration known as neo-functionalism. It also falls under the broad theory of 
supra-nationalism and it construes integration as a complex process in which a technocratic agency 
with autonomy attends to socioeconomic issues of nation-States.33 A key feature of the theory is 
the concept of ‘spill over’, a situation where integration in an  economic sector leads to further 
integration in other sectors, depending on the perceived successes in the management of the 
former. The theory predicts that continuous spill over will result in full integration in all sectors.34 
Notwithstanding the difference between this theory and the functionalist school, it is similar to it 
in that it is receptive of the notion of supra-national entities as the drivers of further integration 
rather than nation States. 
Also within the context of politics and international relations, some other theories on integration 
are the realist and neo-realist perspective and also the liberal and neo- liberal perspective. The 
realist perspective explains integration within the context of the sheer will of States to continue to 
survive in a chaotic and anarchic world. It is argued that the will to survive, prompts States to 
collaborate with each other on the basis of their comparative advantages. Unlike the previously 
considered theories, nation-States rather than supra-national bodies are the principal actors within 
this scheme of integration.35 The neo-realists on the other hand, argue that the international system 
should be seen as a structure, composed of units (States) with functional similarities but with varied 
                                                           
32 David Mitrany, ‘A working peace system’ (1966) 25-99. 
33 Ben Rosamond, ‘Theories of European integration.’ (2000) 51-52. 
34 Ibid. 
35  Geoffrey Godwin, ‘The erosion of external sovereignty? Government and Opposition.’ (1974) 63-64. 
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capabilities.36 It argues that States can only maximise their possibilities of survival by 
cooperating.37 
1.5.2 The Legal theory on integration: 
While the political approaches and theories focus on the socio-economic aims of integration, the 
legal theories focus on the means. Weiler, aptly notes that legal theorists assess the step by step 
implications of integration to member States.38 To legal theorists, integration is first a function of 
law and therefore, rather than focus on assumptions in the analysis of integration, it is imperative 
to focus on the ‘continuous progress of integration’ itself, which is spelled out by laws, agreements 
or treaties.39 Legal treaties are key in every integration process. This is because it spells out the 
limits, rights and the extent of the liabilities of nation States. These treaties establish clearly the 
levels of commitment of states to the integration process and legal theorists argue that integration 
cannot be understood outside this context. 
A significant concept under the legal school of integration is the concept of ‘conservatory 
principles’ which aims at creating a dividing line between the powers of nation states and those of 
transnational organisations in an integration process. Also, it aims at preserving the position of a 
State as the primary structure of the integration process from which the transnational organisation 
derives its legitimacy, in a manner which prevents the submersion of interests of the State to the 
goals of the integration process which ideally should be secondary. In other words, it emphasises 
the protection of core national interests.40 
1.5.3 The Economic theory on integration: 
Economic theorists examine integration within the context of trade liberalizations and expansion. 
Here, integration is a key tool in fostering trade, reducing inequalities and promoting economic 
development. Within the economic context, integration is propagated via trade liberalization which 
is anchored on the economic theory of comparative advantage.  
                                                           
36  Kenneth Waltz, ‘Theories of international politics.’ (1979) 23-45. 
37 Fagbayibo op cit at 29 
38 Joseph Weiler, ‘The community system: The dual character of supra-nationalism’. (1981) 1 Yearbook of European 
Law 270. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Koenraad Lenaerts & Piet Van Nuffel, ‘Constitutional law of the European Union’ (2004) 100-1. 
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The theory of comparative advantage was developed by a 17th-century classical economist David 
Ricardo in an attempt at understanding the dynamics of trade relations between countries. 38 The 
theory of comparative advantage argues that a country would be better off, focusing its resources 
in the production (for trade purposes) of the commodity in which it is more efficient in (or in which 
there is a greater opportunity cost).41 This will lead to specialization, maximized outputs and 
promote mutually profitable division of labor (which greatly enhances the potential of a real 
national product for all nations) and poverty alleviation. The theory has however been criticized 
as a vastly exaggerated elitist scam, which attempts to dismiss the damning distributional effects 
of trade liberalization.42  
In the study of integration, economic theorists employ different approaches. The next phase of this 
chapter shall now consider the different economic models to integration. 
 
1.6 Models of Regional integration 
While the most patronised economic model of integration is the market integration model, other 
models exist. In practice, it has been observed that some overlap occurs between the different 
models,43 however this dissertation will focus on the economic models which are market 
integration, neo-functional integration and development integration. 
1.6.1 Market Integration Model: 
Also known as the customs union theory,44 especially as seen in the early literature on the concept, 
the market integration model envisages a linear process of trade barrier elimination from the free 
trade area to the deepest levels of political union. 45 Commenting on this theory, Gibbs notes that 
it has the feature of being deterministically linear, and representative of a progression of 
increasingly more complex integrative steps towards full economic and political union.46 
                                                           
41 William J. Baumol and Alan S, ‘Blinder Economics: Principles and Policy’ 11 ed (2009) 50 
42  Paul Krugman, ‘Bad Free Trade Arguments’  available at www.krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/03/09/a-
protectionist-moment/, accessed on 10 May 2018 
43 T Ostergaard, ‘Classical Models of Regional Integration: What relevance for Southern Africa?’ (1993) 30. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Bua Balassa, ‘The theory of economic integration’ in Amr Sadek Hosny ‘Theory of Economic Integration: A Survey 
of the Economic and Political Literature’ (2013) 2(5) IJEMSS 133-155 
46 Richard Gibb, ‘Regional Integration and Africa's Development Trajectory: meta-theories, expectations and reality’ 
(2009) 30 Third World Quarterly 701-721. 
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Neo-classical international trade economist, Jacob Viner, is known as the father of the market 
integration theory and therefore developed it within the context of welfare or trade-creating effects. 
Viner argued that a linear approach to integration would be more trade creating than trade diverting 
and will result in significant welfare gains and therefore is a desirable integration model.  It has 
been explained that trade creation results from the replacement of high cost domestic production 
by a lower cost option from another member, thereby entailing economic expansion of one-
member (the lower-cost) country’s industry at the expense of the other (the higher cost). Trade 
diversion on the other hand, represented a reduction in a region’s external trade due to the diversion 
of a county’s demand from the rest of the world. 47 
Viner’s linear and sequential approach was significantly expanded by the Balassa conventional 
analysis of economic integration and explained to occur in stages as states contemplate and then 
commit to progressively higher and more complex levels of integration.48 Under this model, a trade 
advantageous integration approach is prescribed through a series of incremental steps, with each 
step or stage demanding a deeper level of commitment from the states in the integration process. 
The steps are slated to begin from preferential trade arrangements, to a free trade association, to a 
customs union, to the formation of common markets, an economic union and ultimately to the 
creation of a political union.  
Despite the fact that this model found intellectual appeal amongst many European economic 
scholars, it has also drawn a lot of criticisms in its applications in developing countries. On one 
end, Pascal Lamy, former WTO head, notes that the ‘Viner approach’ ignores the diversity in the 
economic landscape of the various regions of the world,49 and Davis criticises the theory as being 
largely inadequate to attend to the demands of the African economic clime in all its peculiarities.50 
It is also argued that the various attempts at integration in Africa which follow the market 
integration approach have failed because they are underpinned by a desperate attempt to prioritise 
economic objectives whilst ignoring the non-economic State-centric objectives. Also the model is 
                                                           
47 Ostergaard op cit at 34. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Pascal Lamy, ‘Regional Integration in Africa: ambitions and vicissitudes’ in Ismail op cit at 35 
50 Davies R, ‘Promoting Regional Integration in Africa: An Analyses of Prospects and Problems from a South African 
Perspective’ in Ismail op cit at 35. 
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undermined by its inability to recognise the individuality of the states involved.51 In place of this 
model, economic pundits advocate for the development integration model which is considered 
below. 
1.6.2 Development Integration Model: 
The development integration model emphasises the imperatives for both macro and micro co-
ordination in a multi-sectoral programme which encapsulates production, infrastructure and 
trade.52  The model represents an interim shift in focus by economic theorists from a model 
concentrated on only trade and its barriers to one centred on production capacity, planning and 
cooperation for the propagation of development. The model arose in reaction to the inadequacies 
of the market integration approach and emerged as an integration strategy alternative, which took 
more cognizance of the peculiarities of the developing world. This model recognises the low level 
of industrialization in developing regions of the world and consequently, emphasises  how to 
invigorate or catalyse the industrial capacity of those regions rather than focus on the efficient 
maximization of the existing poor capacity.53  
 
Development integration is characterised by the conscious intervention, by the regional partners 
to promote cooperation and interdependence by ensuring the equitable distribution of the gains of 
integration, using compensatory and corrective mechanisms.54 Ismail notes that a key proponent 
of this approach is the UNECA, which has referred to it as development regionalism and is marked 
by the fostering of cross-border cooperation between countries in a region in not only trade but 
also in  investment, research and infrastructural development.55 The need for this approach comes 
in the wake of the realisation that the exposure of under-developed industries to competition could 
have devastating effects by leading to de-industrialisation rather than industrialisation.56  
 
                                                           
51 Gibbs op cit at 706. 
52 Ismail op cit at 36. 
53 Ostergaard op cit at 34. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ismail op cit at 37 
56 UNECA Economic Report on Africa 2015. Industrializing Through Trade (2015) available at http://www.uneca. 
org/publications/economic-report-africa-2015 accessed on 21 May 2018.  
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Development integration consequently combines a strong institutional capacity and architecture 
with clearly articulated goals including the facilitation of regional development and the assurance 
of peace and security towards the achievement of complementary and asymmetrical gains for all 
member states involved in the regional development project. It also involves the articulation of 
regional public goods and development priorities necessary for facilitating economic 
transformation in the region in various areas including infrastructure, trade, agriculture and food 
security, private sector development and industrialization, in a bid to evolve a bond of common 
regional citizenship and identity necessary for regional human capital mobilization.57 
1.6.3 Functional and Neo- Functional Integration: 
The functionalist model of integration emerged in the wake of the Second World War. It argued 
for the development of a supranational organization to ensure that disharmony in states does not 
drive them towards aggression and war in the scale witnessed in the Second World War. Within 
the context of the functionalist model, integration was imperative not just for the propagation of 
trade-based growth and economic development (like the previously assessed models emphasised) 
but for the guaranteeing of social harmony by proffering solutions to the fundamental problem of 
international peace and security. Romanian-born British political theorist, David Mitrany is 
considered to be the foremost advocate of this model. He argued that areas should be identified 
through which states would understand the imperatives for cooperation. He also argued that the 
establishment of supranational organisations to develop international functional links and attend 
to basic functional needs (such as transportation welfare, trade and healthcare) would lead to the 
development of a transnational consciousness and greatly reduce the risk of war and aggression.58 
Neo-Functionalism on the other hand, emerged as a modification of functionalism in the wake of 
the Second World War. It was propounded by Ernst B. Haas who argued that the dominant players 
in an integration process were interest groups, civil societies and technocrats rather than 
governments. A key feature of the theory is the concept of ‘spill over’, which is a situation where 
integration  in an economic sector leads to further integration in other sectors depending on the 
                                                           
57 Adejumobi, S & Kreiter, Z ‘The Theory and Discourse of Developmental Regionalism’, Paper prepared for 
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perceived successes in the management of the former. The theory predicts that continuous spill 
over will result in full integration in all sectors.59 The neo -functionalist model has however been 
criticized as impracticable in the third world because it ignores the fact that regions with low levels 
of economic development like most of the third world lack the appropriate environment for interest 
groups, civil societies and technocratic institutions to thrive;  factors which the neo -functionalist 
model argues to be integral drivers of integration. In Africa for instance, the significant absence of 
interest groups in the 1960s and 1970s meant that governments were the decision-makers and 
therefore the drivers of integration.  
1.7 Conclusion 
Without prejudice to the profundity of the goals of the AfCFT initiative and the zeal showed by 
the continent’s leaders in this regard, the need for caution exists in order to forestall a situation 
where the success of the initiative is interpreted in terms of ‘more trade’ instead of the growth and 
development it was created to spur. Joseph Stigliz, a Nobel Prize winning economist, argues that 
this was the greatest tragedy of the integration efforts in Europe. 60 It is therefore exigent that in 
the negotiations to follow, Africa takes the right steps in its integration efforts to ensure its efficacy. 
In this regard, the model to be employed must pay attention to the individual needs of all 
stakeholders, so that the gains of the initiative will be equitable across the board.  
This chapter provides the theoretical foundation for this dissertation centered on Africa’s emerging 
integration paradigm- the AfCFTA. In order to efficiently do this, the chapter examined the 
conceptual framework as well as the theoretical and multi-disciplinary perspectives on integration. 
This was done to provide a fair understanding and framework for the research. The next chapter 
builds on the theoretical expositions above by examining the trajectory of African integration as 
well as key initiatives which molded Africa’s integration narrative before the AfCFTA. 
 
 
 
                                                           
59 Rosamond op cit 50 - 73 
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CHAPTER 2: 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: CLASSIFICATIONS AND 
HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The idea of integration on the continent is by no means novel. Since colonial times, attempts have 
been made at building supranational entities through integration. A case in point was the federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the federations in former French West and Equatorial Africa, albeit 
for administrative and legal convenience of the colonial government.6162 With independence, came 
a resurgence of integration as a way of consolidating the gains of independence and protecting the 
sovereignty of African states. Efforts were geared towards establishing integration initiatives at 
sub-regional levels to cater to the need for economic development across the colonially-defined 
territories.63 Independent African countries pursued integration in order to stem the adverse effects 
of balkanization by the previous decades of colonialism and ease the constraints linked to the 
limited size of national markets.64  
This chapter provides a discussion of the historical trajectory of integration in Africa as a 
background to the continental free trade initiative. It does this by first outlining the approaches the 
continent has employed to integration and then evaluates key integration initiatives on the African 
continent, within the context of the events which informed them, the legal framework on which 
they were structured and the approaches by which they were propelled. A historical evaluation at 
this point should foster a better understanding of the changes that have occurred in the continent’s 
integration narrative and show why the continent is on this present course. 
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2.2 Approaches to Regional Integration in Africa 
The approaches which the African continent has taken towards integration over the years have 
been driven by both its compelling need to address under-development and fulfil of the pan-
African mandate of political unity.65 This pertinent need to drive development on the continent has 
led it to establish integration schemes modelled after the European integration agenda.66 However, 
it has been argued that the market integration formula has not proved as successful as in Europe in 
solving the African integration equation.67 Proponents blame its failure mainly on the fact that the 
model was not created to suit African realities.  
In this light, several commentators advise towards a reconsideration of the market-based 
integration formula and urge that “actors … should think very carefully about the fruitfulness of 
following the blueprint of the European Union or other regional schemes from the North.”68 It is 
noted that “one thing African integration does not lack is a plethora of theoretical suppositions” 
which differ based on the ideological beliefs prevalent in the place from which they emerged.69 
The approaches to African integration have been classified under two broad headings- old 
regionalism and new regionalism. Akokpari identifies the WIDER alternative and the external 
guarantor alternative to belong to the ‘new regionalism’ class.70  
2.2.1 Old Regionalism:  
As previously stated, regionalism is by no means a contemporary phenomenon. In a commentary 
on the same topic, Burfisher et al. explain that the historical disparities between the old and the 
new forms is marked by the varying depths, along a ‘continuum from shallow to deep’. While 
shallow integration (old) is simply marked by reduced barriers to trade in goods, deep integration 
(new) is so extensive that it covers even the harmonization of national policies, and internal factor 
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mobility71. The old regionalism emerged in Europe and was inspired predominantly by the events 
occurring after the Second World War. As a result of the most devastating war in the history of 
mankind, it was only natural that in the integration process, priority was given to the aims of 
preferential trading arrangements and the formation of security alliances.72 
In Africa, the old approach to regionalism was mainly influenced by the need for economic security 
and was spurred by narrow ideological objectives.73 Regional organisations formed between the 
1960s and 1980s employed this approach, and being that the approach primarily emerged as an 
expression of the need to guarantee economic security against the backdrop of the intricate 
dynamics of independent governance, it was only natural that the principal actor under this 
approach was the State. Regional organisations formed in Africa before the end of the 1980s have 
been classified under the old regionalism category, not just because they were introverted in 
approach and State-centric in nature, but mostly because they employed the neo-classical 
theoretical assumptions which integration models in the cold war era employed. The narrative in 
Africa under this regime was influenced by the assumptions of the dependency theory, which 
blames African under-development on capitalist exploitation and on the plunder of its vast natural 
resources by external agencies.74 
Scholarly commentary regarding the old regionalism approaches to African integration is mostly 
negative. In justifying the commentaries on the failure of the old regionalism approach to yield 
results, Meagher mentions that the approach was riddled with many problems including the 
proliferation of moribund international organisations, the existence of over-ambitious treaties 
(compounded by the continent’s characteristic failure to implement same), stringent commitment 
to European models of integration, inability to increase trade figures amongst African countries 
and the lack of political will.75 With several failed attempts of the old regionalism approach to fit 
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into the outward décor of the postmodern era, the need to phase it out became a super-imposed 
imperative.76 
Regional organisations in Africa which notably employed this approach to integration (as 
evidenced from their programmes and initiatives) include the OAU which was formed in 1963 and 
the ECOWAS formed in 1975. 
2.2.2 New Regionalism: 
The new regionalism approach has been noted to be everything the old approach is not. It is 
influenced by in-depth economic factors from within and below, outward-looking and largely 
driven by not only State actors but also non-State actors.77 The new regionalism’s approach is 
more comprehensive in seeking a balance between the different factors affecting security and 
development.78 Speaking on its multi-dimensional form, Swedish author, professor and one of the 
most prominent pundits of the new regionalism approach- Björn Hettne, defines it as “a  ... form 
of integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far 
beyond the goal of creating region-based free trade regimes. Instead, the political ambition of 
establishing regional coherence and identity seems to be of primary importance”.79  
Several forms of the new regionalism approach to integration have been theorised. Akokpari 
identifies some forms of new regionalism which have suited the peculiarities of the African 
experiment at integration under four headings namely- open regionalism, the WIDER approach, 
regionalism from below and the external guarantor model.80 
 
2.2.3 Open Regionalism:  
This variant is a strain of the neo-classical, market integration model. It emphasises trade 
liberalisation and the importance of fostering integration by employing policy measures which 
reduce barriers to trade. This variant calls for an outward-oriented approach to integration and like 
                                                           
76 Ibid. at 15. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Gaudence Nyirabikali,  ‘Promoting socio-economic development through Regional integration – the politics of 
regional Economic communities in Africa (unpublished Master’s thesis, Linkoping University, 2006) 
79 Swatuk L, ‘Comparing regionalisms: Implications for global development’ (2002) 10;2 Millennium-Journal of 
International Studies. 126-155. 
80 Akokpari J. op cit 89. 
 20 
the classical theories, have as a basis of its arguments for openness, the theory of comparative 
analysis. The model has however been criticised as ignoring the peculiarities which inform the 
African reality and will therefore not serve its unique interest. Examples of notable initiatives in 
favour of this variant are NEPAD and the AU.81 
The WIDER Model: This model emerged from the United Nations University’s World Institute 
for Development and Economic Research (WIDER), located in Finland. The premise on which the 
variant is built is in diametric opposition to the previously mentioned variant which bears neo-
functional features. It argues that neo-liberal globalisation as is driven in Europe will not suit the 
true demands of integration in developing continents like Africa.82 The WIDER approach, had in 
the early 1990s carried out a study of integration with its focus on the explanation of the role of 
socio-economic and political factors on the workability of the integration process and determined 
that “new regionalism is a multidimensional process that leads to hegemony in areas such as 
culture, politics, economics and diplomacy.”83 The model argues that the aim of interrelations and 
regional cooperation between states should be to counter globalisation and allow for regional 
interdependence. According to this model, globalisation is harmful to development in developing 
regions of the world.  
Regionalism from below: Like the WIDER model, regionalism from below argues for the 
abandonment of neo-classical models of integration which worked in the west for models which 
incorporate non-State actors. It is argued that the neo-classical models of integration are out of 
touch with the realities of Africa.84 Here, the role of civil society, pressure groups as well as the 
informal sector is key to the success of integration. The informal sector, in particular, is argued to 
be important because it has become enlarged due to the failure of African governments to provide 
for the basic needs of its population. It is argued therefore, that its large size could be advantageous 
if efficiently utilized in the integration process.85 Commenting on the importance of the informal 
economy, Boas et al mentions that the informal economy needs to be re-attached to the formal 
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economy because it (the informal economy) has desirable (even though sometimes unsustainable) 
components  such as imagination, entrepreneurship and innovation.86 
The External Guarantor model: This model was first proposed by Jeffery Fine and Stephen Yeo in 
their paper titled “Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dead End or a Fresh Start?” and 
argued for the supervision of the African integration process by external multinational bodies who 
will serve as ‘external guarantors’.87 Their model was necessitated mainly by the fact that previous 
attempts to employ market integration-based models in Africa had proven unsuccessful. 
Supervision by this ‘external guarantor’ (such as the EU or IMF) was therefore necessary to 
provide technical support and also to ensure that programmes, schemes or policies which will not 
be beneficial to the ends of the integration process will be avoided. Commenting on this model 
Lee states: 
“The argument for such an arrangement is premised on the notion that “previous 
attempts at regional integration, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, have failed to realize 
even a modest part of their stated aims… renewed efforts along these traditional lines 
are not advisable, for two reasons. First, closer integration in terms of freer flows of 
goods and services is now more likely to result from unilateral tariff reduction that 
confers most-favoured-nation status on one’s neighbours. Second, there are unlikely 
to be any significant immediate economic gains (at least in the short run) from access 
to a larger local market and the removal of trade distortions. Certainly, such gains 
would not justify a major effort to shore up existing regional entities that, for reasons 
argued earlier, are inappropriately structured, since they were designed to pursue a 
very different approach to economic development”. 88 
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) formed in 1994 to promote economic 
integration in West Africa by converging macroeconomic policies, favoured this model. The 
External guarantor in this instance was France.89 
 
2.3 A Trajectory of African Integration 
The African consciousness on integration is evident from the historical initiatives it has taken to 
push the agenda. The approaches taken at each point, reflect the continent’s desire to employ new 
means to address the functional demands of its increasing population. Understanding these 
                                                           
86 Ibid. 
87 Jeffrey Fine & Stephen Yeo, ‘Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dead End or a Fresh Start?’ (1997) in 
Lee op cit 19. 
88 Lee op cit 19.  
89 Ibid. 
 22 
historical initiatives therefore, not only serves as the first step in appreciating the integration 
dynamics as it is evolving today, but also provides a useful instrument for predicting the course it 
might take in the future.  Having examined the categorizations, some key landmarks in Africa’s 
integration agenda are considered next. 
 
2.3.1 The Organisation of African Unity 
The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was the culmination of the post-
independence mission of African leaders to demonstrate the progressive attainment of sovereignty 
on the continent.90 Of all the initiatives which were instrumental in defining the trajectory of 
integration in Africa, the Organisation of African Unity formed in 1963 was arguably the most 
significant. This is because it was the foundation and propellant for a series of other initiatives by 
the African people to chart the course of their existence. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
is therefore significant to this work because it provided the building blocks to the structures for 
integration which today, has culminated in the formation of the largest free trade area in history.  
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed after a meeting was convened from the 
22nd to the 25th May 1963 by 32 heads of states of independent African countries. Its creation was 
informed by the need for a supranational entity on the continent to promote unity and solidarity 
amongst African states91and to coordinate efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa.92  
However, upon the realization that achieving a better life for  African people would be impossible 
if some were still shackled by colonialism and the newly independent states still struggled to grasp 
the intricate dynamics of governing the colonially defined territories, the Organisation of African 
Unity’s (OAU) role became geared towards agitating for independence of other colonized African 
countries, as well as providing a framework for the management of ugly trends such as military 
interventions and civil wars which were a direct demonstration of the socio-political contests that 
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immediately surfaced in the newly independent countries.93  The main avenues for the 
accomplishment of these objectives were policy coordination and cooperation in a number of 
spheres including, political, economic and diplomatic cooperation. It was no surprise therefore that 
in the periods immediately after the institution’s formation, the integration agenda took somewhat 
of a back seat.94  
By the 1970s, the need for a shift in the focus of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) became 
imperative. This necessity was imposed by a number of things including the fact that 48 per cent 
of the population of sub-Saharan Africa existed on less than $1 a day.95 Therefore the perceived 
bleakness in the economic outlook of the continent in the early 1970s was reason enough for the 
institution to consider a balance between its political aims and other economic objectives. The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) therefore redirected the integration project to the principles 
of mutual dependence, self-reliance and solidarity.96     
In this regard, Nubong explains that “several meetings, seminars and brainstorming sessions 
organized” in conjunction with the Professor Adebayo Adedeji-headed United Nation’s Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) was geared towards recommending inter alia... remedies to the 
economic disasters confronting the young continent. 97  Examples of these include the 11th 
extraordinary session of the Organisation of African Unity’s council of ministers held in 1976 in 
which the Kinshasa Declaration was made as well as the 4th and 5th ECA Ministers Conference 
Kinshasa of 1977 (and 1979) and also the Monrovia Symposium of 1979. Many of the 
symposiums, workshops and seminars provided platforms for African states to articulate their 
individual goals of regional and sub-regional integration that would eventually constitute the 
building blocks for the scale of continental integration that is observed today.  A most significant 
outcome of these events is the policy document on economic integration adopted as the Lagos Plan 
of Action (LPA).98  
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2.3.2 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was a development plan drawn up and signed by African Heads 
of governments in response to the economic crisis bedevilling the continent post-independence.99 
The LPA was a legal, economic and political statement by continental leaders, reflecting the 
compromises reached by African countries with diversified development options and economic 
philosophies.100 It was a look inwards at what Africans could do to aid in restructuring its 
productive base and to chart a new course towards self-reliant development. It was regarded as a 
remarkable expression of the continent’s willingness towards a critical conceptualization of its 
development pathway, laying therefore an intellectual foundation for building a new future.101 
The Plan was preceded by a series of in-depth considerations by the continent’s foremost experts 
in economic policy culminating in the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment which spelt out 
“guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in economic and social 
development for the establishment of a new international economic order" in July 1979 in 
Liberia.102In a proactive bid to ensure that the recommendations of the Monrovia declaration were 
implemented, the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the OAU held in Lagos Nigeria from 28 to 29th 
April 1980, where the Final Act of Lagos was adopted. The UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) was integral to plotting the plan and this was reflected in the considerable resemblance 
of its operational frameworks to the UNECA’s annual reports.103 Its adoption therefore, 
‘contributed to set the basis for a productive relationship between the UNECA and the OAU and 
consequently, endowed UNECA Secretary General- Professor Adedeji- with greater visibility.104  
The Lagos Plan of Action was strategized based on the principles of self-reliance, mutual 
dependence and solidarity.105 It focused on the integration of physical and social infrastructure on 
                                                           
Envisioning Africa. Nairobi, Kenya. 26-29 April In Nubong op cit. See Also Organization of African Unity, ‘Lagos 
Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980 – 2000’. (1980). 
99 JL Parpart, ‘Women’s Rights and the Lagos Plan of Action’ (1986) 8;2 Human Rights Quarterly180–196. 
100 A Benachenhou, ‘South-South Cooperation: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa’s Independence’ (1983)8; 4 
Africa Development / Afrique et Développement 5–19. 
101 David Fashole Luke and Timothy M Shaw, ‘Continental Crisis: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's Future’ eds 
(1984) 231. 
102 Francis Nguendi Ikome, ‘From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: the 
political economy of African regional initiatives’ (2007) chapter 1. See also Lagos Plan of Action. (1979). Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia: Organization of African Unity. 
103 Gruhn Isabel, ‘The Economic Commission for Africa’ in Daniel C. Bach ‘Regionalism in Africa: Genealogies, 
institutions and trans-State networks’ (2016) 50. 
104 Bach Ibid. at 50. 
105 Annex I Final Act of Lagos, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980. 
 25 
the continent, political stabilization and security for the guarantee of a steady economic 
environment, for the sustenance of economic initiatives and enterprise, and the integration of 
production structures based on the market integration model. A noteworthy feature of the plan was 
that it contained industrial development objectives with short, medium and long term goals.106 The 
short-term industrial goal was to immediately “conduct studies that will establish the basic 
industries to be developed in the short run”, as well as those to be developed in the long run, in 
order to lay foundations for the formation of those basic industries essential for self-reliance.107 
The medium-term goal was to strengthen the short term goal by driving self-sustained 
industrialisation within 10 years and “do all within their power to attain self-sufficiency” in the 
food, building materials, clothing and energy sectors.108 The long-term development strategy was 
to achieve two per cent of the world’s industrial production by the year 2000 in accordance with 
the ‘Lima Target’.109 In this regard industrial structures were to be created at national levels aimed 
at “establishing links between industry and other sectors” and also between industrial sub-sectors 
in order to promote interdependence amongst them and lead to over-all economic development.110 
Without prejudice to the fact that the Plan aroused considerable skepticism from the international 
community and especially international institutions like the Bretton Woods for being imprecise 
and unduly political, it derived validation and strength from its endorsement by all African 
leaders.111 The Lagos Plan of Action is therefore significant because it was a reflection of 
unyielding faith by African states in its united ability to advance its economic interest in 
development. The Plan is also crucial to the narrative of African integration because it was the first 
in a series of thrusts towards establishing an African Economic Community, in respect of which 
was signed in Abuja in June 1991.112 
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2.3.3 The Abuja Treaty: The New Paradigm 
The Abuja treaty formally known as the ‘Treaty establishing the African Economic Community’, 
was specifically focused on the establishment of a fully economically integrated continent by 
2028.113 Building on the agenda set by the LPA, it was adopted to organize a time frame of Africa's 
regional economic integration.114  The Treaty of Abuja was signed at a summit of the Organization 
of African Unity held in Nigeria in 1991 and it set the foundations for a scale of integration which 
was envisioned to be achieved in six phases. The Abuja treaty remains significant to African 
integration because it set a holistic strategy for achieving this goal. 
The objectives of the treaty were to further the course of integration through endogenous and self-
sustained development, as well as the establishment of a defined framework for the mobilization 
and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa. The Abuja treaty was also created 
to further promote pan-African cooperation in order to raise the standard of living on the continent, 
maintain economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations and contribute to the progress, 
development and the economic integration of the continent. The aims of the treaty would be 
achieved by the harmonization of policies among existing and future economic communities, 
whilst strengthening them in the hopes of gradually but eventually establishing an AEC. 115 Ikome 
argues that before the signing of the African Economic Community Treaty, the existing RECs 
were “weak and largely paper organizations whose elaborate treaties had nothing more than 
memorials of faulty development strategies” and which therefore made it needful to strengthen 
them to meet the demands of integration. 116 
The approach to integration as espoused by the Abuja treaty bore a semblance to the Eurocentric 
market integration formula and was to be linearly furthered through the utilization of the regional 
economic blocs, which it designated as its pillars. It was therefore in an expression of this formula 
that it initially earmarked the first five years of its coming into force for the strengthening of 
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Regional Economic Communities. While the second phase, scheduled to last for a period of eight 
years, was dedicated to solidifying sectoral integration by reducing tariff barriers to trade, the third 
and fourth phases were dedicated to the formation of a continental free trade area and customs 
union by the harmonization of tariffs and imposition of a common external tariff within a total 
period of twelve years. The fifth phase (scheduled to take four years) was to be dedicated to the 
creation of an African common market. The sixth and final phase was dedicated to the formation 
of an economic and monetary union within five years, marking the zenith of the integration 
process. 117 
Contrary to arguments that the Abuja treaty was conferred with ambitions different from those 
assigned in the stalled Lagos Plan of Action,118 the framework that was created through the Abuja 
treaty had its foundations in the LPA. The Abuja treaty is especially significant because it was 
designed on the canvas of the Lagos Plan of Action which guided the integration process through 
to the formation of the African Union and beyond. It may be argued that the ‘Abuja treaty chapter 
of the African integration process is an expression of the progressive nature of Africa’s efforts at 
integration.  
2.3.4 Integration in the democratisation Era: the African Union 
The formation of the African Union marked the second wave of African integration. Its 
establishment was prompted by the need to accelerate the process of integration on the continent 
using a new institutional vehicle, a compass which recognized the pre-eminent demand of peace, 
unity, socio-economic stability and development on the continent over one founded with an 
objective of fighting colonialism which had at the time been defeated.119 The transformation of 
Africa’s supranational entity from OAU to the African Union (AU) was an incidence of the 
integration process, by which the continent repositioned itself to address the multifaceted socio-
economic and political quandaries it was faced with as a fully independent regional bloc. The 
furtherance of principles such as democracy and the rule of Law, and the sustenance of peace, 
unity and development were high on the AU agenda.120 Like its forerunner, the African Union is 
important to any account of integration on the continent because its initiatives have served the 
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purpose of oiling the wheels of integration and has today resulted in the formation of the largest 
free trade area since the World Trade Organisation.  
The idea of forming the African Union emerged at the 35th Ordinary session of the OAU Assembly, 
held in Algeria. The Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, proposed the convening of an 
extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya in September 1999, to discuss ways in which the institution 
could be made more effective and responsive to the contemporary demands of development on the 
continent.121  At the Summit subsequently held on the 9th of September, 1999 in Sirte, Libya, a 
declaration was adopted by African leaders calling for the establishment of an African Union, 
without however specifying the form or shape the new entity would take.   A team of legal experts 
was convened which came up with a draft legal text tabled at an Organization of African Unity 
ministerial meeting held in Tripoli between May and June 2000, at which the AU framework was 
finalized.122  The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted by the Assembly on July 11, 
2000, in Lomé, Togo and by March 2001, all the member states of the Organization of African 
Unity had acceded to it, thereby bringing it into effect.123  
Even though the African Union bore considerable similarities to its supranational forerunner, the 
OAU, some structural changes were evident. For example, its central role was expected to shift to 
tackling the contemporary demands of development on the continent. According to Fagbayibo, 
other noteworthy features include its many sources of authority such as the Assembly of the Union, 
the Judiciary (Court of Justice) and Parliament (PAP) (unlike the former which derived its 
authority from only the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments), the creation of the right 
to intervention in member States in grave circumstances, and its more proactive approach to 
integration by absorbing the Treaty of the African Economic and its regional integration 
programme as its pillars.124 
Unlike the OAU Secretariat, which had no power to take initiative without agreement from the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, the African Union Commission has specific 
powers with regard to taking initiative. This has secured the advantage of enabling the African 
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Union to lay out schemes for integration and development. As a result, it has in just 19 years, been 
able to expeditiously carve out a road map for the scale of integration being pursued at present. 
Some initiatives of the African Union leading up to the AfCFTA will now be considered. 
2.3.5 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) emerged after a resolution had been 
adopted to merge the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and 
the OMEGA Plan for Africa to form a ‘New Africa Initiative (NAI) at the 5 th Extra-ordinary 
Summit of the OAU held in Libya, in March 2001.125 The strategic framework document for 
NEPAD was subsequently adopted in July 2001 at the 37th session of the Assembly of Heads of 
States and Governments held in Lusaka, Zambia. The founding countries were Nigeria, South 
Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal.126 NEPAD remains one of the most significant initiatives of 
the AU to drive the agenda of integration in the democratisation era of the continent. The central 
aims of NEPAD were eradicating poverty, integrating Africa into the global economy, women 
empowerment and establishing a stable environment conducive to peace, sustainable economic 
growth and development.127  
Having in mind the overall goal of integration, NEPAD was established with a holistic and 
comprehensive strategy for the revival of the continent.128 Praising its profound approach, Algerian 
prime minister Ahmed Ouyahia noted that its establishment represented a new methodical 
approach to integration and a radical shift from the models employed by the OAU to one which 
would positively affect the architecture of African integration.129 Its principles were targeted 
towards promoting good leadership and political participation as well as the conditions conducive 
for business and investment.  
The NEPAD initiative also provides for the African peer review mechanism, which was a self-
monitoring protocol and arrangement founded in 2003 to encourage conformity in terms of the 
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economic and corporate governance values and code. The founding of the African peer review 
mechanism amongst other things, expresses the developmental approach the NEPAD initiative 
was founded on and by which the clear intent to make reforms for increased investments on the 
continent in areas of agriculture, science, trade, health and governance was expressed. NEPAD is 
currently coordinated by a planning and coordinating agency (the NEPAD Agency), which was 
established in 2010 after the body was integrated into the AU structures.130 
 
2.3.6 Integration in the Democratization Era: The Tripartite Free Trade Area 
The Tripartite Free Trade Area was an outcome of an initiative launched in Kampala, Uganda in 
2008 for furthering the integration and cooperation agenda on the continent along the corridors of 
three of the existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs): COMESA, EAC and SADC.131 
Sequel to the first tripartite summit which launched the initiative, a second summit was held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in June 2011, which approved the tripartite strategy document for the 
initiative, thereby launching the TFTA negotiations. Also, a third tripartite summit was held in 
Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, in June 2015, where the TFTA was officially launched, and where 16 of 
the 26 countries which participated in the negotiations signed.132 
Like the AfCFTA, the Tripartite Free Trade Area was ambitious in its coverage as it brought 
together about 630 million people in 26 southern and eastern African countries, with a combined 
gross domestic product of more than US$1.2 Trillion in 2013.133  The TFTA’s approach to 
integration followed the developmental regionalism model established on three main pillars 
namely; infrastructural development for connectivity along the North-South corridor, industrial 
development towards attending to productive capacity issues and the dictates of market 
integration.134 
The first tripartite initiative launched in 2008 and acceded to in 2012 by African Union Heads of 
States and Governments became the first of two initiatives, aimed at resolving the ‘multiple 
membership conundrum’ by uniting the RECs on the continent for the creation of a larger 
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AfCFTA.135 The tripartite Free Trade Area could be seen as a precursor to the AfCFTA, which 
makes it relevant to this work. Its creation was a significant technical step towards forming the 
Continental Free Trade Area and eventually, the African Economic Community envisaged by the 
Abuja Treaty.136 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter of the research is divided into two broad segments through which the build-up to 
African integration was examined. While the first part discussed the classifications relevant to 
African integration, broadly classified by Akokpari into ‘old Regionalism’ and ‘New 
Regionalism’, the second part of the chapter assesses key historical initiatives which have defined 
the trajectory of integration on the continent.  
The discussion on the history of integration in Africa in this chapter is useful to show how the 
continent progressed to the AfCFTA and provide a means through which the integration dynamics 
as they are developing can be understood. Having established the historical context on which 
integration in Africa was built, the next chapter shall undertake an in-depth evaluation of the 
AfCFTA. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE AFRICAN FREE TRADE INITIATIVE: PROSPECTS FOR 
CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The idea of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was conceived not just with the 
aim of encouraging the formation of markets in regions through preferential trade but also to foster 
higher levels of intra-African trade and encourage competition on the continent. Competition is 
envisaged to foster development via the promotion of free movement of goods, services, 
investment and people.137 Having considered previous African integration initiatives, this chapter 
examines the rationale and design of the AfCFTA, analysing selected aspects of the negotiation 
process and the legal text produced by it. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. While the first section examines the AfCFTA in context 
and theory, within which the rationale and projected gains of the initiative are elaborated, the 
second section examines the technicalities, i.e. negotiation process and the legal provisions, 
through which the AfCFTA initiative’s theoretical projections and aspirations may be made 
practical.   
 
3.2 The African Continental Free Trade Initiative: Imperatives and 
Prospective Gains 
The decision to establish a free trade area for the Continent was first officially adopted in Addis 
Ababa in 2012 at the 18th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, in line with the 
aspirations long agreed upon under the Abuja treaty of 1991. The free trade area was envisioned 
to amalgamate the 55 African countries of over a billion people, with a combined GDP of about 
$3.5 trillion Dollars.138139 Also at the summit, by virtue of an endorsed ‘Action Plan on Boosting 
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Intra African Trade’ (BIAT), the continental integration and development framework was charged 
to pay special attention to the areas of trade infrastructure, trade facilitation, trade finance, trade 
policy, trade information, productive capacity and factor market integration.  
In June 2015 at the 21st summit of the AU Assembly of heads of states and governments, 
negotiations were officially launched with a mandate to conclude a framework by 2017 for 
liberalisation with respect to trade in goods and services and consequently birth a continent wide 
free trade area.140 By March 2018, the negotiations had yielded results, and at an extraordinary 
summit of the African Union Assembly convened in Rwanda, the Kigali Declaration (for the 
launch of the AfCFTA), the protocol relating to the free movement of people141 and most 
importantly a consolidated agreement establishing the AfCFTA were presented for signatures. 
142143 The AfCFT Agreement comprises a protocol on trade in goods, a protocol on trade in services 
and a protocol relating to the settlement of disputes.144 Forty-four countries signed the consolidated 
text at the summit and five other countries145 signed at the 31st African Union summit later held in 
June 2018 in Mauritania .  
The AfCFTA has four theoretical objectives. While the first is to create a continental market for 
goods and services which will be facilitated by free movement of business and investment, 
projected to pave the way for the establishment of a continental customs union, its second objective 
is the expansion of intra-African trade by coordinating trade facilitation and liberalisation 
frameworks. The third objective is to attend to the ‘spaghetti bowl dilemma’ or the issue of 
multiple memberships which has been an impediment to integration initiatives in the regional 
economic communities in Africa. The fourth objective is to drive industrial and entrepreneurial 
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competition via the exploitation of opportunities of scale production and consequently lead to an 
equitable distribution of recourses.146  
The formation of the AfCFTA provides a platform for national and regional economic cooperation 
in order to spearhead Africa’s implementation of the new development agenda.147 It builds on the 
progress made by several integration initiatives and in line with the Abuja treaty, fast-tracks by 
two years, the completion of stage four with regard to Free Trade Areas.148 The AfCFTA was 
given the mandate to pursue a development regionalism strategy.149 
It is envisaged that the AfCFTA initiative will mostly affect trade with the key beneficiaries being 
businesses, traders and consumers who will pay reduced tariffs on selected goods traded within 
the area.  The arrangements are also structured with mechanisms for the reduction of non-tariff 
impediments to trade, such as onerous customs and technical regulations as well as sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary measures.150 The AfCFTA also has ambitions for the most expansive levels of 
cooperation between customs authorities in the world, for the facilitation of unhindered trade 
across national boundaries.151 Through service, trade liberalization industries across the continent 
will have access to a wider pool of skilled professionals and other personnel on ‘no less 
favorable’152 terms than the domestic supply. Furthermore, under the AfCFTA initiative, regional 
value chains will be established in order to catalyze growth and development in the landscapes of 
investment and trade across the continent.153  
3.2.1 Imperatives of the African Continental Free Trade Initiative 
Two main factors (within which the other rationales converge) make the AfCFTA imperative: 
cooperation and economic development. On the first note, the idea of integrating the continent in 
the manner and scale envisaged by the AfCFTA has been argued to be crucial for the enhancement 
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of economic and political cooperation.154 After independence, the continent under the auspices of 
the newly formed Organization of African Unity made a commitment to collectively deal with the 
intricate dynamics of statehood; the AfCFTA is somewhat of a renewal of that pact on cooperation 
for growth, but this time in the era of globalization. Cooperation within the context of the initiative 
includes all forms of collaboration between countries on ventures ranging from the execution of 
joint projects to technical sectors partnership and even policy harmonization as well as the joint 
development of common natural resources on the continent.155 
Attending to the demands of development on an increasingly expanding continent, is another 
reason which makes the AfCFTA pertinent. Since the Lagos Plan of Action set the terms for 
African integration, up until 2016, the continent’s population trebled from its estimated 478 million 
to the current estimate of close to 1.2 billion and is projected to increase to 1.5 billion by 2025 and 
2.4 billion by 2050. 156  With an annual average of 2% population growth, the continent today is 
ranked as the fastest growing continent in the world. In terms of urbanization, the continent also 
leads as urbanization on the continent is now 40%, compared to 27% in 1980. Despite the 
demographic increases, the development indices leave much to be desired.  For example, 60% of 
the continent still lives without conditions amenable to development. Today, of all the people 
around the world living in extreme poverty, about 50% reside in sub-Saharan Africa,157and only a 
few selected cities on the continent can boast of adequate infrastructure to cater to the demands of 
sustainable development.158 
Economic and trade theorists posit that increased commercial activity will most likely lead to 
improved welfare across the board and then sustainable development.159 However, because intra -
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African trade stands at less than 20%, mostly due to a deficit in key cross-border infrastructures, 
it is argued that hopes of continental development without attending first to the demands of 
integration will be like putting the cart before the ox.160 In this new world of globalization as well 
as the global value chain phenomena, which has resulted in the East Asian miracle’,161 by which 
over a billion people in South East Asia have escaped debilitating economic conditions, 
collectively utilizing opportunities from around the resource-abundant continent is an imposed 
necessity for development. Therefore, the imperative for the AfCFTA can be appreciated when 
viewed as a pathway to an ‘African Miracle’. In the next segment, the discussion assess the 
prospective gains of the initiative. 
 
3.2.2 Prospective Gains of the African Continental Free Trade Initiative 
The AfCFTA will lead to the formation of the largest regional market since the WTO, which will 
foster competition amongst domestic enterprises and consequently lead to improved production 
and economies of scale. The initiative is designed to erase national borders which have over time 
served as barriers to trade by converting the continent, once comprising of 55 fragmented markets 
(most of which struggle to achieve economies of scale and export competitiveness) to a single 
market of over a billion producers and consumers. This single market will lead to the levels of 
competition, improved production and economies of scale which is responsible for the decline in 
poverty and rise in development as witnessed in South East Asia.  On the benefits of a large market, 
the ICTSD projects that a large market attracts more FDI and “triggering a trade–investment nexus 
that supports Africa’s structural transformation objectives.”162 
African competition and growth will depend on labor mobility. However, according to the Africa 
Visa Openness Report 2017, still less than a quarter of all African countries provide liberal access 
at entry for all African citizens.163 The AfCFTA comes with a promise of free movement of 
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business people for economic purposes. To this effect, a protocol to the treaty establishing the 
African Economic Community, relating to the free movement of persons, rights of person and 
rights of establishment was adopted at the 30th ordinary session of the African Union to 
complement the AfCFTA, by guaranteeing mobility rights for economic purposes. According to 
the protocol, this is to be pursued in three phases- beginning with the abolition of visas in the first 
phase, the implementation of the right of residence in the second phase and the implementation of 
a right to establishment in the final phase. 164 It is expected that the protocol will complement the 
AfCFTA by increasing intra-African commercial activities by 52.3%.165 By the year 2034, it is 
estimated that Africa will have a large working-age population of over 1 billion people.166 The 
AfCFTA protocol on the free movement of people sets the stage for the optimization of this large 
labor pool by allowing unhindered access to regions where their skills will be most efficiently 
utilized.  
It is envisaged that the AfCFTA will also aid in combatting and decreasing poverty on the 
continent. The World Bank estimates that more poor people live in sub-Saharan Africa today than 
when the framework for African development was set out in the Abuja Treaty.167 This disturbing 
fact has been attributed to the high levels of unemployment, inequality and the lack of basic 
infrastructure.168 By setting the stage for increased trade, the AfCFTA if appropriately coordinated 
can reduce unemployment, improve infrastructure and halt the pernicious effects of poverty. The 
bulk of the people who live in extreme poverty across Africa reside in the rural areas where 
constraints arising from communal conflicts, unhealthy customary practices, gender inequalities 
and illiteracy, impede their ability to break free from the shackles of poverty. It is envisaged that 
the AfCFTA will gainfully impact this demographic by linking the informal rural communities of 
Africa to the opportunities presented by an increased cosmopolitan market, leading to the exchange 
of ideas for upliftment, progress and prosperity. It will also provide a route for small rural 
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businesses to grow and increase their capacity to leave the informal rural sector and participate in 
the larger economy.169 
The above-mentioned benefits are embedded in the other advantages of the AfCFTA, such as the 
facilitation of the provision of regional public goods which may lower trade costs and the 
enhancement of the scale of industrialization necessary to meet the continent’s vision of 
sustainable development (VISION 2063). Other benefits include the creation of regional 
production networks for the continent’s transformation objectives and also the creation of 
opportunities for cooperation, thereby increasing Africa’s common voice and influence on global 
issues.170 
3.3    Negotiating African Development through the AfCFT Agreement 
Negotiations for the AfCFTA were launched in June 2015 at the 21st summit of the African Union 
Assembly. Twelve key principles guided the two phases of the negotiations. These were: (i) most 
favourable nation (MFN) treatment (ii.) national treatment principle (iii.) reciprocity (iv.) special 
and differential treatment (v.) transparency (vi.) substantial liberalization (vii.) consensus (viii.) 
best practices (ix.) reservation of acquis171 (x) variable geometry (xi.) to be driven by AU member 
states, RECs and customs territories with the support of the African Union Commission, and (xii.) 
for the FTAs in RECs to serve as building blocks for the AfCFTA.172 
The negotiations were structured to take place in two phases. The negotiating mandate for the first 
phase covered the areas of trade in goods, trade in services and dispute settlement, and was 
coordinated by the African Union Commission’s department for trade and industry. The phase was 
negotiated over the course of three years, with official work beginning in February 2016, when the 
first meeting of the Continental Free Trade Area Negotiating Forum (CFTA-NF) held in Addis 
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Ababa to consider all the “post-launch preparatory and essential process issues, as well as technical 
documents that will enable the efficient conduct of the negotiations”.173   
Over the course of ten sessions held in Addis Ababa, Niamey and later  at Abuja, Senior Trade 
Officials (STO) of African Union member states, relevant experts from the recognised Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), members of the Continental Task Force (CTF) which included 
institutions such as, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Trade Policy Centre 
(ATPC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB),174 met to review the progress of the various 
technical working groups set up to fashion the legal framework for the Agreement creating the 
AfCFTA. By the 8th session of the CFTA-NF held in Abuja Nigeria in November 2017, a draft 
text was ready for final review and after two final legal scrub up sessions, the legal text was 
submitted to the African Union Assembly in Kigali in March 2018. 
Negotiations on tariff concessions are still ongoing and are expected to be tabled by January 2019. 
The tariff schedule negotiations have modest ambitions. It aims to get negotiating parties to agree 
within five years, to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade  with respect to 90% of all goods traded. 
175 In line with the principle of special and differential treatment, cases are being made for some 
‘relaxed commitments’ with respect to transitional periods for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Those countries 
hope, on the entry into force of the AfCFTA (and on account of their level of development), to be 
allowed a lower ambition level of 85% for all goods to be reduced to zero tariffs,  and after fifteen 
years,  increased to the required 90%.  
The AfCFT Agreement contains a ‘rendezvous clause’,176 stipulating that the second phase of the 
negotiations is only to commence after the adoption of the legal text produced pursuant to the first 
phase of negotiations. The second phase of negotiations, therefore, commenced in August 2018 
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and the mandate of negotiators is to provide a working framework for other significant issues not 
covered by the first phase. These issues are on investment, competition and intellectual property 
and are expected to be submitted for adoption to the January 2020 Session of the African Union 
assembly.177  
The AfCFTA negotiations were not without challenges. These challenges were however 
envisioned to arise as an incidence of Africa’s unique dynamics.178 Being the largest continent in 
the world in terms of the number of countries (and the heterogeneity of cultures within them), 
negotiators were faced with the challenge of finding a way to capture the aspirations of all parties. 
Negotiators also had the challenge of finding an acceptable way to deal with the intricacies 
surrounding sensitive issues such as “the multitude of sub-regional and inter-sub-regional 
integration processes and handling asymmetric levels of integration already achieved in the issues 
relating to overlapping memberships, the economic issues of low income, least developed 
countries, undiversified economies and how to manage the issue of the huge tariff revenue reliance 
by various governments. 
3.4 A Profile of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.179 
3.4.1 The Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area: The Agreement 
establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area is made up of seven parts and is accompanied 
by three supplementary protocols. The three protocols are: the protocol on trade in goods, the 
protocol on trade in services and the Protocol on rules and procedures on the settlement of 
Disputes. While the supplementary protocol on trade in goods and the Protocol on rules and 
procedures on the settlement of Disputes are supported by annexes, the annexes to the protocol on 
trade in services are still being negotiated.180  
The agreement acknowledges that the underlying aim of the initiative is deepening economic 
integration through securing partnerships on the continent for the promotion of agricultural 
development, food security, industrialisation and structural economic transformation.181 This is a 
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reiteration of the sentiments expressed in the Abuja Treaty. The agreement progresses into nine 
sub-parts, the first of which attends to definitional issues. Noteworthy in this section is the 
reference to ‘the Vienna convention on the law of treaties’, ‘the general agreement of trade in 
services’ and ‘the general agreement on trade in goods’ thereby making apparent the negotiating 
principle of ‘best practices’ and leading to the inference of external influence in the drafting of the 
text.182  
Parts two and three broadly makes provisions on core establishment, objectives, guiding principles, 
scope and the administrative aspects. While Article 2 establishes an African Continental Free 
Trade Area, to be known simply as ‘the AfCFTA’, Article 9 sets up the framework for its 
implementation, facilitation and monitoring. This framework consists of the African Union 
Assembly,183 a council of ministers,184 a committee of senior trade officials,185 all of which are to 
be headquartered at the Secretariat and described as an autonomous body with an independent 
legal personality within the African Union.186 While part four emphasises the imperatives of 
openness and transparency, part five secures preferential treatment for all states in the AfCFTA. 
Pursuant to Article 19, parties are to “accord each other preferences on a reciprocal basis that are 
not less favourable than those given to third parties when implementing this Agreement”. The 
Dispute settlement mechanism established in the agreement only apply to disputes between State 
parties and is to be administered in accordance a separate protocol in regard to same.187 Part four 
adopts the most favourable nation models as contained in the World Trade Organization’s general 
agreement for tariff & trade. The last part of the main agreement deals with the dispute resolution 
mechanisms and finalisations.188  
 
The agreement and the supplementary protocols enter into force 30 days after the 22nd instrument 
of ratification is deposited. However, the agreement becomes enforceable against any State party 
on the date that party deposits its accession instrument.189 The AfCFT Agreement is subject to 
review every five years,190 however, amendments may be proposed to the secretariat by State 
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parties, which, after facilitating a review and a broad consultation process, may submit the 
amendment to the assembly for adoption by a consensus. 
 
3.4.2 The Protocol on Trade in Goods:  
The protocol on trade in goods is the first protocol to the AfCFT Agreement and its central 
objective is to supplement the AfCFTA by setting up a liberalized market for the trade in goods. 
The protocol is the most extensive document in the AfCFTA suite of documents. It is comprised 
of eight parts and nine annexes, with some of the annexes,191 additionally comprising schedules, 
guidelines and appendices. Like the AfCFT Agreement, and in the same fashion as the World 
Trade Organization’s general agreement for tariff & trade, the protocol reiterates the most 
favourable nation and national treatment principles, reinforces the significance of non-
discrimination to the facilitation of an open and liberalized market for goods trade.192 While some 
tariff is permitted to be levied at reduced rates, quantitative restriction and non-tariff barriers are 
expressly prohibited.193 Part four of the protocol encourages customs cooperation,194 trade 
facilitation195 and transit.196  The protocol also makes provision for trade remedies.197 Noteworthy, 
is the provision which stipulates that the imposition of remedies within the AfCFTA will be in 
accordance with Article XIX of the General Agreement for Trade & Tariff and the World Trade 
Organization’s agreements.198 Product standards and measures to attend to the sanitary and phyto-
sanitary condition of goods traded within the free trade zone are permitted under the protocol to 
be imposed by State parties, however subject to the conditions spelled out by the protocol’s 
annexes six and seven.  
 
Like the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the protocol also provides for 
exceptional instances in which a State may deviate from its commitments amongst which include: 
for purposes of preserving public morality, protecting health and life, relating to gold or silver 
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exports and for the conservation of national resources.199 Other exceptions include security 200and 
balance of payment issues.201 Another noteworthy provision in the protocol is the special and 
differential treatment allowance,202 under which flexibility is required to be given to parties at 
different levels of economic development, including but not limited to special consideration and 
additional transition period in the implementation of the agreement. This provision is to allow for 
an even distribution of benefits attainable under the AfCFTA arrangement. Monitoring of the 
protocol is to be carried out by a committee for trade in goods, which is overseen by the council 
of ministers.203 The protocol contains comprehensive annexes on the schedule of tariff 
commitments,204 rules of origin, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, non-trade barriers, 
technical barriers to trade measures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and transit and trade 
remedies. 
 
3.4.3      The Protocol on Trade in Services:  
The protocol on trade in services is not as exhaustive as the protocol on trade in goods. It contains 
six parts of twenty nine articles and six annexes which are still being negotiated. The broad 
objective of the protocol is to create a single liberalised market for service trade by eliminating 
barriers to trade in services.205 Within the context of the protocol, ‘services’ exclude those supplied 
in the exercise of government authority206 and the term ‘trade in services means “the supply of 
service from the territory of one State party into the territory of any other State party or from the 
territory of one State party to a service consumer of any other State party or by a service supplier 
of one State party, through commercial presence in the territory of any other State party or by a 
service supplier of one State party, through the presence of natural persons of a State party in the 
territory of any other State party”.207 The protocol allows leverage to State parties to “regulate and 
introduce regulations on services and service suppliers within its territory in order to meet national 
policy objectives,” in so far as those regulations do not disturb the commitments under the 
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protocols208 and are administered reasonably, objectively, transparently209 and  reflect non-
discrimination principles.210 The protocol also stipulates the recognition of the education licenses, 
certifications or experience obtained in one State by another State party for the purposes of the 
fulfilment of national standards or criteria.211 In this respect a State party may not accord 
recognition in a way which constitutes a means of discrimination between State parties in the 
application of its standards of criteria for authorisation, licensing or other certifications obtained.212 
 
3.4.4 The Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Dispute:  
The third protocol is on rules and procedures on the settlement of disputes and it covers any 
disagreement between State parties regarding the interpretation and/or application of the 
Agreement in relation to their rights and obligations.213 The protocol is aimed at creating the 
framework for the transparent, accountable, fair, predictable and consistent settlement of 
disagreements arising from the interpretation of the provisions of the AfCFTA.214 The protocol 
comprises 31 articles creating the panel and stipulating the methods of dispute resolution and three 
annexes on the working procedures of the Panel. A more detailed assessment of the protocol and 
its unique method of dispute resolution will be conducted in the next chapter. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter assessed the AfCFTA, considered as the most extensive step towards African 
integration yet.  The AfCFTA is built on the need to foster development through economic 
cooperation and also to drive increased trade by establishing a single market for goods and services 
in which investment and labour mobility are encouraged, ultimately leading to rapid development. 
The second part of the chapter appraised the rule-based context of the AfCFT Agreement and also 
the negotiation process through which it was produced. The comprehensiveness of the legal text 
and the principles which guided its formulation are a pointer to the level of commitment by most 
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African countries not just to increasing trade but also to ensuring that there is asymmetrical 
distribution of benefits to address the continent’s asymmetrical pattern of development.  
However, in most multilateral arrangements with ambitions like the AfCFTA, factors are likely to 
arise which lead to misinterpretation of obligations and ultimately broken promises. This makes a 
dispute settlement and legal interpretation system imperative. Against this background, the next 
chapter of this research focuses on the third protocol to the AfCFTA on rules and procedures on 
the settlement of disputes especially in the light of the continent’s trends towards regional dispute 
settlement. The next chapter starts with a brief discussion of existing regional Courts. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 
AND COMPLIANCE 
4.1 Introduction. 
This research recognizes that the achievement of the aims set out in any supranational initiative is 
dependent on its component parts operating with some degree of efficiency. A dispute settlement 
system guarantees this needed efficiency by providing a means through which disputes are settled, 
and it is against this background that African integration initiatives have always provided for a 
functional system for conflict management.215  
This chapter considers the mechanisms through which disputes which arise in the course of deeper 
integration under the continental free trade initiative will be resolved.216 This is considered 
important to this research because the continental free trade initiative must have the ability to 
manage the intricate dynamics arising from deeper integration and also to ensure its success. 
 This chapter first examines the notion of dispute settlement within an African integration context. 
In so doing it identifies existing dispute resolution institutions on the continent and discusses the 
nature of dispute settlement faced by African regional Courts. This section also examines the issue 
of compliance and enforcement which are some of the persisting challenges facing selected 
regional Courts in Africa. This appraisal provides the necessary context for assessing the 
continental free trade initiative’s dispute settlement system and the adequacy of the provisions of 
the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes.  
4.2 Dispute Settlement in a Regional Context 
The emergence of regional dispute settlement systems to ease the friction associated with 
integration, was an expression of the increasing appreciation of the significance of cooperation in 
legal and judicial matters for the proper functioning of regional processes and institutions.217 Alabi 
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notes that this emergence of Courts as a supranational judicial arm was perceived as valuable to 
the reform agenda to reposition the continent to play a dynamic role in contemporary international 
relations.218 It was also regarded as a central element for providing security and predictability in a 
system to which State parties would commit some degree of their sovereignty.219 An institution 
for the preservation of the rights and obligations of all State parties, as well as for the clarification 
of  existing provisions of the Agreement (in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law), was perceived to be imperative for easing tensions arising from deeper 
integration.  
In this regard, the ECOWAS Court blazed the trail in activating judicial dispute settlement 
mechanisms in 1991. Similar steps were taken by the Union Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique 
de l’Ouest (UEMOA) in 1994,220 the Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale 
(CEMAC) in 1994, by COMESA in 1998 and also by the East African Community (EAC) in 
Arusha (Tanzania), in 2002.221 The members of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) had signed a protocol on a Tribunal in Windhoek in 2000. However, it faced challenges 
in the wake of the Campbell v. Zimbabwe case which proved fatal to the existence of the 
Tribunal.222 A new protocol on the Southern African Development Community’s Tribunal was 
however signed in August 2014 in Zambia.  
Over the years, regional Courts have served as interesting examples of the impact of regional 
systems often projected against a background of less than perfect democratic systems in their 
member states.  These Courts, despite the wide reach of their powers, often fall short of 
expectation.223 The reason for this has been broadly attributed to the compliance-based nature of 
international law and the impracticality of having a supreme executive take on the task of enforcing 
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judicial decisions, against the enforcement-based nature of domestic laws.224 Therefore, the 
absence of a clear framework to guarantee compliance and enforcement presents the most 
prominent affront to the efficiency of African regional Courts, and creates the foundation on which 
the other challenges of the Courts are predicated. 
4.3 An Appraisal of the third protocol to the African Continental Free 
Trade Agreement on Dispute Settlement 
The African continental Free trade Initiative’s dispute settlement framework bears similarities with 
the World Trade Organization’s Dispute settlement framework. This comes as no surprise as the 
World Trade Organization’s system is regarded as the most sophisticated legal framework for 
multilateral relations.225 This is because since the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement 
system’s formation in 1995, it has operated with relative efficiency, settling close to six hundred 
disputes and garnering the confidence of the international community.226 While the parties 
appealed nearly every panel report in the early years of the dispute settlement system, the appeal 
rate has significantly decreased over the past few years. The dispute settlement system has only in 
seven instances, granted authorization to a complainant to suspend its obligations, and in all seven 
cases, arbitration took place because the respondents disagreed with the complainants’ proposal 
for suspension.227 
The African continental free trade initiative aims to attain that level of proficiency and therefore 
models its dispute settlement system in like fashion, to be administered in accordance with a 
protocol on rules and  procedures on the settlement of disputes (dispute settlement protocol).228 
The protocol establishes a dispute settlement body (DSB) to serve the role of securing the 
predictability of the regional trading system; by preserving the rights and obligations of State 
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parties and clarifying the existing provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law governing dispute settlement between State parties.229  
The scope of the DSB’s mandate to govern disputes between State parties, reflects the intention of 
the initiative to focus on harmonizing governmental trade policies while treating the disputes 
arising from it as incidental and not to further the interests of the individual trader.230 This means 
that according to existing protocols and agreements relating to the initiative, private and individual 
rights cannot be directly asserted before the scheme’s dispute settlement body. 231  
The dispute settlement body is vested with the authority to establish dispute settlement panels and 
an appellate body. These are to be like a Court of first instance and an appellate Court within 
domestic judicial systems, and are to be composed of representatives from State parties.232 The 
role of the dispute settlement body with respect to the panels and appellate body is therefore to 
establish their procedural rules to guarantee their efficiency, adopt reports from them and also to 
perform other supervisory roles.233 The decisions of the dispute settlement body in this regard are 
to be made by consensus.234 The parties to a dispute under the Agreement are at liberty to refer 
their disputes for arbitration as the first dispute settlement avenue,235 in which case the use of the 
dispute settlement body is foreclosed, till the arbitration option is exhausted.236  
Like the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution system, the dispute settlement process of 
the continental free trade initiative is initiated by a request for consultations.237 The aim of the 
consultations is to find an amicable settlement option for the dispute using means such as good 
offices, conciliation and mediation, as provided under the protocol. This is laudable because it 
embraces the contemporary, non-hostile approach to dispute settlement. Where an amicable 
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settlement proves abortive, a complainant may proceed to notify the other party in writing of its 
intention to refer the matter to the dispute settlement body.238 The dispute settlement body responds 
to such a referral by establishing an impartial and qualified dispute settlement panel within fifteen 
days,239 along with its rules of procedure and its terms of reference, after which the parties are 
promptly notified of the composition.240  
The main role of the panel is to assist the dispute settlement body in discharging its responsibilities 
by objectively assessing the matter before it and making its impartial and just recommendations 
known to the dispute settlement body, after the parties have been given equal opportunity to be 
heard.241 The dispute settlement body may consider the report of the panel twenty days after it was 
submitted to it.242 This is to afford each party the opportunity to decide whether it is interested in 
objecting to the report in an appeal,243 in which case, the report shall not be considered, but rather 
an appellate body is constituted by the dispute settlement body for the review of the panel’s 
report.244 The report of the appellate body is not subject to further appeal by the parties and is 
binding. It is however subject to a consensus decision of the dispute settlement body.245 
As far as the dispute settlement process is concerned, the Secretariat of the African continental 
trade initiative plays a secretarial role. In addition to assisting panels on the legal, historical and 
procedural aspects of matters dealt with, the secretariat is to facilitate the constitution of panels in 
all matters. To this end, the protocol stipulates that the Secretariat should avail the panel with 
experienced international trade law experts to assist with the dispute resolution process. Also, the 
Secretariat is responsible for all relevant notifications to and from the dispute settlement body and 
State parties.246 
Although the AfCFTA’s dispute resolution enabling protocol system is yet to be operational, some 
of its features which may have a positive effect on the operation of the AfCFTA and which should 
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be safeguarded include its enforcement system which was designed to guarantee compliance by 
allowing for the suspension concessions by complaining parties to other State parties who default 
in implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.247 Also, the protocol’s framework 
for monitoring the implementation of the recommendations handed down by the Panel or Appellate 
body and also for the recourse to arbitration which may decide on stipulated compliance and 
enforcement issues are commendable.248 This WTO style framework for enforcement provides a 
more elaborate guarantee for compliance than other systems existing in the African RECs.  
With respect to the dispute settlement protocol’s WTO-style framework, it is also laudable that in 
the attempt to replicate the efficiency of the WTO’s dispute settlement system by adopting the 
latter’s design, caution was exercised to evade the ‘sequencing dilemma’ issue (as it is commonly 
known by international trade law theorists)249 inherent in the WTO’s Dispute settlement system.250 
Explaining this problem, Novakovic comments: 
“Article 22 (of the Dispute Settlement Understanding) allows a prevailing party to 
request authorization to retaliate within 20 days after a compliance period ends, while 
Article 21.534 (also of the Dispute Settlement Understanding) provides that 
disagreements over the existence or adequacy of compliance measures are to be 
decided using WTO dispute procedures, including resort to panels. A compliance 
panel’s report is due within 90 days after the dispute is referred to it and may be 
appealed. However, the DSU does not integrate the Article 21.5 procedure into the 30- 
day Article 22 deadline, nor does it expressly state how compliance is to be determined 
so that a prevailing party may pursue retaliatory action under Article 22. ... Suppose 
the respondent takes the full ‘reasonable period of time’ before announcing a reform of 
the offending policy measure. If the complainant believes the reform is insufficient to 
make the policy WTO consistent, there is the opportunity to refer the matter to a Panel 
(again, preferably the original one). The Panel in turn must report within 90 days of 
that request (DSU Article 21.5). If the respondent is unhappy with the Panel’s ruling, 
another 45 days could be required for the Appellate Body to consider the matter. The 
apparent dilemma is that even if the Panel or Appellate Body finds the reformed policy 
still WTO-inconsistent, the 20 days after the ‘reasonable period of time’ for a 
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complainant to lodge a request to retaliate will have expired. This interpretation of DSU 
Articles 21.5 and 22 suggests there could be an endless loop of litigation.”251 
 
With respect to when a complaining party may retaliate against a party in default whose measure 
is deemed inconsistent with AfCFTA obligations, the AfCFTA provides that within 20 days (of 
an inability to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution to implementation), the complaining party 
may request authorisation from the DSB to suspend  the application of concessions or other 
obligations to the party in default252 and the DSB shall grant or reject the authorisation in 30 
days.253 The protocol was careful in not fixing a time limit within which a party may apply for 
authorisation thereby escaping the sequencing dilemma issue as in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO.  
The Protocol is not without its imperfections, one of which is that it rules out the settlement of 
disputes in sectors like the informal cross-border trade. The informal economy is the largest 
employer of labour in Africa, contributing an average of 40% of intra-African Trade.254 
Considering this, a framework for settlement of disputes therein should not be ignored. This does 
not translate to a recommendation that informal traders gain unhindered access to the DSB. Rather 
what should be provided is a framework for accessible, decentralised semi-formal alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism and for settlement of disputes in the informal trade economy. 
4.4 The Compliance Quandary of Regional Obligations in Africa 
The ratification of international instruments is generally an expression of a commitment towards 
respecting and complying with decisions of judicial bodies empowered to adjudicate over disputes 
arising from those protocols and instruments. However, in the case of African regional Courts, 
partial compliance or no compliance at all seems to be the general rule,255 resulting in the 
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undermining of the dispute settlement processes as well as the entire progressive framework of the 
regional scheme.  Most perplexing about the enforceability dilemma is, why African states bind 
themselves to treaties and regional Courts’ protocols if it is not a true expression of their will to 
comply with its decisions. Therefore, the most prominent challenge experienced by regional 
dispute settlement mechanisms in Africa is the non-compliance and enforcement issue. 
In no regional Court on the African continent has the compliance problem manifested more 
prominently than in the SADC Tribunal. Even though the SADC treaty made provision for the 
existence of the Tribunal in 1992 when it came into force, 256 the institution only considered 
actually developing the Court eight years after its formation. The Tribunal was elaborately 
established as a framework for the settlement of disputes arising from its working protocols.257 
The Tribunal was charged with the duty to ensure the proper interpretation of the provisions of the 
SADC treaty and its subsidiary instruments, to adjudicate on the disputes referred to it and to 
ensure adherence to its decisions.258 The Tribunal was created with features which made its 
decisions binding, enforceable against the disputants and not subject to appeal,259 thereby 
demonstrating the confidence of SADC in the efficacy of the Tribunal to ease the frictions 
emanating from the system. This confidence however withered when the Tribunal’s decisions 
against Zimbabwe could not be enforced against it mostly for political reasons.260 The most 
prominent of these decisions was the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of 
Zimbabwe,261 which resulted in the Tribunal’s collapse in 2010. 
Between 2002 and 2008, the government of Zimbabwe had taken measures to expropriate land 
from white farmers regardless of their Zimbabwean citizenship, status, length of residence and 
proper use of their land.262 On application to the SADC Tribunal by the white farmers, the 
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expropriation drive was denounced as an indirect act of racial discrimination repugnant to the 
SADC Treaty and many other international conventions.263 The Tribunal went on to uphold the 
entitlement of the farmers to the land and ordered fair compensation for any expropriation already 
done, ordering further, the protection of possessions, occupation and ownership of applicants from 
any interference by the Zimbabwean government.264 The Tribunal’s judgment was dismissed by 
the Robert Mugabe-led Zimbabwe as an “exercise in futility”, while going ahead with the 
expropriations.265 In response to this, the applicants applied to the Tribunal to declare the actions 
of the government of Zimbabwe as contemptuous, which succeeded. In 2009, the government of 
Zimbabwe unilaterally withdrew from the Tribunal’s protocol, setting in motion a chain of 
politico-legal events which, in the silence and acquiescence of other SADC governments, led to 
the collapse of the Tribunal in 2010. 
This flagrant disrespect for legal commitment and Court rulings is however not unique to the 
SADC, as other regional Courts have also had their legitimacy and authority threatened by the 
flagrant disregard of its decisions by State parties. Examples are, the ECOWAS Community Court 
of Justice’s decision with respect to the 2016 case of Sambo Dasuki v. The Federal Republic of 
Nigeria,266 in which the Court condemned the arbitrary detention of the applicant as contrary to 
Article 6 of the African Charter on Human Rights and Article 9 (1) of the International Order on 
Civil and Political Rights (in defiance of Nigerian Courts) and consequently ordered his release 
with N15 million Naira damages; 267 the Nigerian Government simply refused to comply with this 
judgment.  
Also, in the East African Community case of Anyang’ Nyong’o & Ors. v. The Attorney-General 
of Kenya,268 after the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) issued a ruling interdicting certain 
individual from Kenya who had been elected as Kenyan representatives to the East African 
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Legislative Assembly (EALA), the East African Community member states proceeded to 
undermine the judgment by amending the East African Community Treaty. Even the protocol to 
the Establishment of the African Court which created the African Court in 2004,269 has not been 
insulated from the enforcement challenges facing African supranational and regional Courts. Its 
judgment in Tanganyika Law Society v Mtilika270, decided in 2013 remains yet to be enforced.  
4.5 Reasons for Non-Compliance with Regional Obligations and the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement’s Dispute Settlement System 
The above cases are only a few of the instances in which State parties have ignored judgments of 
regional Courts. This clearly expresses the hierarchical priorities of parties to regional integration 
arrangements, in which the political commitment to, and demands of sovereignty rank higher than 
the formal imperatives of justice, fairness and the rule of law.271 Amongst African leaders, a system 
of block protectionism exists, in which leaders are more inclined to protect each other whilst hiding 
under the veil of non-interference.272 This results in the erosion of credibility of Courts,273 which 
if sustained would result in the eventual collapse of the dispute settlement system, putting the entire 
regional arrangement at the risk of failure.  
To fully grasp the reasons for non-compliance, an understanding of what compliance itself entails 
is insightful. Von Stein makes an argument for two orders of compliance, the first being the 
adherence to international rules and the second order being the adherence to international 
rulings.274 This research embraces both orders as relevant to the compliance issue of regional 
Courts’ decisions. Furthermore, the context within which the notion of compliance is viewed in 
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this research is the degree to which State behavior conforms to the terms of international 
agreements entered into by it.275 
The prominent factors attributed for compliance with multilateral obligations, within which all 
other factors may be collapsed are the fear of sanctions, the respect for the rule of law276 and the 
presence of monitoring mechanisms for enforcement.277 This, therefore, means that in the absence 
of sanctions, the political will to respect international commitments and enforcement mechanisms 
to guarantee compliance, non-compliance will be recurrent. Conversely, where there are clearly 
stipulated clauses in international agreements which provide for sanctions and enforcement 
frameworks for those sanctions in default of performance, the political will which is usually 
existent at the time those agreements are ratified would be sustained. A relevant question within 
the context of the discourse on African regional Courts is therefore, to what extent does the now 
defunct Southern African Development Community Tribunal’s protocol, as well as the East 
African Court of Justice (EACJ) protocol and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) 
protocol, provide measures to attend to the compliance issue?  
The Southern African Development Community Tribunal’s protocol provides that the foreign 
judgment enforcement laws of the State where its decision is to be enforced is to govern the 
enforcement of its decisions and any failure to so enforce is to be reported to the Summit for 
‘appropriate action’.278 No mention is made of what an ‘appropriate action’ entails. This weak 
framework for enforcement was what allowed Zimbabwe to get away with its affront to the 
legitimacy of the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell Case.279 Similarly, a weak framework for the 
enforcement of the regional Courts’ judgment is also present in the East African Community’s 
treaty, which merely imposes the responsibility of enforcing judgments on the State in which the 
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judgments are to be enforced.280 Also in the case of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice 
(ECCJ), there is an uncertain enforcement framework. Pursuant to a supplementary protocol,281 
the method of implementing the judgment of the Court is by serving a writ of execution to the 
registrar of the member State in which the judgement is to be executed.  
In all the cases stated above, the responsibility for enforcing the judgment of the Court as spelt out 
in the protocols and agreements are inadequately assigned. Once states become part of a regional 
body, the regional body must not only be responsible for enforcing its rules (and the judgments 
emanating from its Courts) but must, in addition, show a willingness to implement sanctions 
against defaulters.  However, since an institution cannot act outside the scope of the law which 
creates it, where the law does not clearly provide the requisite framework for enforcement, the 
institution cannot validly act.  
Unlike the framework for regional Courts on the continent, The AfCFTA initiative’s dispute 
settlement framework attends to compliance and enforcement issues differently and with a lot less 
uncertainty. Where the panel or appellate body decides that a measure is inconsistent with 
obligations under the initiative, (and the dispute settlement body by a consensus endorses this 
decision), the party which imposed the measure is advised to bring its measure into conformity 
with the trade agreement protocol breached.282 State Parties are required to fully implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the dispute settlement body.283 Aggrieved parties are entitled, on 
a temporary basis, to compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations if the 
recommendations and rulings of the dispute settlement body are not implemented within a 
reasonable period of time.284 If the State party in breach fails to comply with the Panel or appellate 
body’s decisions and rulings within a reasonable period of time, such State party shall, if so 
requested, enter into negotiations with a complaining party with a view to developing a mutually 
acceptable compensation. If this fails, a complaining party may request authorization from the 
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dispute settlement body to suspend the application to the State party concerned, of concessions or 
other obligations under the Agreement.285 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was highlighted that dispute settlement institutions in Africa have increased with 
deepening integration in the 1990s. However, because of the inadequate framework for compliance 
and enforcement, regional Courts in Africa have not been very effective in advancing deeper 
cooperation and integration. Using examples from the SADC Tribunal, the EACJ and the ECCJ, 
this chapter gave instances of legal disputes illustrating the compliance quandary bedeviling 
Africa’s regional Courts. This provided a context for assessing the possible reasons for non-
compliance and benchmarking the levels of preparedness of the AfCFTA’s dispute settlement 
mechanism to handle non-compliance.  
An assessment of the innovations in the dispute settlement protocol of the African Continental 
Free Trade Agreement (which bears similarities to the World Trade Organization’s dispute 
settlement mechanism) highlights the difference in approach, especially with regard to compliance. 
The framework for the AfCFTA’s dispute settlement system was shown to include post-
adjudication mechanisms to monitor compliance and to allow for repercussions in instances of 
default. The presence of a properly spelled out framework for compliance and enforcement is an 
indication that the AfCFTA’s dispute settlement system is more equipped, than any previous 
regional dispute system on the continent, to handle the vagaries of integration and guarantee the 
initiative’s efficiency.   
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CHAPTER 5: 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
In three phases, this research examined the economic integration efforts in Africa. First the study 
discussed a number of integration theories, then a historical evaluation of African integration was 
made, beginning from the early independence period till date.286 After several decades of 
experimenting with different integration initiatives built on different economic ideologies and 
hypotheses, the continent finally negotiated the framework for a continental free trade area.  
The study has shown that the aspirations of the AfCFTA is to achieve the increment of the 
continent’s intra-African trade indices from less than 20 percent presently, to above 50 percent by 
the year 2063, and also to cater to the demands of the levels of development, expressive of pan-
Africanist ideals and the visions of an African renaissance. With the Continent’s population 
expected to hit the 2 billion mark in 2050, 287 the study shows that a continental pact of this nature 
is timely. 
Also in this study, the AfCFT Agreements were evaluated. The agreements includes protocols on 
trade in goods, trade in services and relating to the settlement of disputes. From the legal 
framework, the study identified four areas which the AfCFTA initiative considers a priority. The 
first, is the creation of a continental market for goods and services, facilitated by free movement 
of business and investment. The second, is the expansion of intra-African trade by coordinating 
trade facilitation and liberalisation frameworks. This is followed by the need to attend to the 
impediments and issues associated with multiple memberships in the regional economic 
communities and lastly, to drive industry and competition by exploiting opportunities of scale 
production.  
This study indicates that the scheme is employing the trade route to sustainable development. In 
this regard, the key beneficiaries are businesses, traders and consumers who will pay reduced 
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tariffs on selected goods traded within the area. This framework reflects the requisite clarity of 
purpose, which is needed for the successful implementation of the initiative. 
Given the ambitious nature of the initiative, the possibility of misinterpretation of obligations and 
ultimately broken promises, the dispute settlement protocol of the AfCFTA was also discussed. 
This assessment was necessary especially due to the continent’s chequered history with dispute 
settlement and compliance with dispute resolution mechanisms.  
In evaluating the dispute resolution system created under the AfCFTA, the study acknowledged 
the theoretical uniqueness of the system as far as African integration is concerned. The resolution 
mechanism included frameworks for alternative dispute resolution such as mediation, conciliation, 
good offices and arbitration, indicating its embrace of a contemporary, non-hostile approach to 
dispute settlement. Furthermore, the dispute settlement protocol contains an elaborate framework 
for dispute resolution including a compliance and enforcement system which is similar to the 
WTO’s, and unlike the framework for other regional Courts on the continent.  
5.2 Recommendations 
This research has established that the long-standing imperative of economic development as well 
as the political mandate of African unity had informed the adoption of the market integration 
approach. This is why an assessment of the trajectory of integration on the continent reflected more 
theoretical frameworks for integration without the actual tangible results. Even after the adoption 
of the Abuja Treaty in 1991, which set ambitious aims for integration and sustainable development, 
the continent’s potential for real growth was still unrealised. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
AfCFTA had made an assessment of both the market integration (which had been favoured at the 
earlier stages of African integration) and the development-driven models of integration and 
concluded that the latter is more suited to African realities.288 Accordingly this section of the 
research makes a number of recommendations. 
Firstly, the implementation of the AfCFT Agreement will require internal strategic effort. 
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Challenges related to cost,289 the continent’s multilingual nature290 absence of infrastructure and 
also the initial short term losses associated with the uneven distribution of wealth and resources 
between countries with varying production capacities, are expected to arise. Therefore it is 
recommended that the framework for its implementation be strategic in anticipating and attending 
to these issues. Here the responsibility will lie most with the AfCFTA Secretariat to devise an 
internal strategy for implementation and also for monitoring member State reactions (and 
engagements) with AfCFTA obligations. This is necessary to prevent, as Owoeye argues, “the 
criticism of... being like the Orwellian animal farm with equal animals and with others more equal 
than the others”.  With a strategic framework for implemented and monitoring comes a promise of 
success, an assurance of fair treatment, and a guarantee of equal distribution of benefits. 
Secondly, this research recommends the adoption of a external trade and investment policy with 
respect to non-parties to AfCFT Agreement across the world. In this research one of the theoretical 
incidences of a Free Trade Area was identified to be trade diversion (i.e. from the more expensive 
external markets to the markets within the free trade zone).291 Therefore it becomes important to 
adopt a trade policy detailing harmonized terms of trade engagement with respect to especially 
Africa’s previous external trade hegemons such as the US, China and the EU, from whom the most 
significant trade diversion is expected. In the same way there always existed Trade policies of 
these hegemons on Africa, a foreign trade strategy of the AfCFTA to the hegemons will serve as 
a strategy statement which shall be founded on principles agreed by member States and which will 
define the terms of engagement of the AfCFTA on its external trade partners and foreign investors, 
on strategic support and cooperation leading to a stronger position in international trade 
negotiations and lead to a more controlled framework for external trade going forward. 
Thirdly, attention must be paid to the informal economy. This research identified that Africa’s 
informal economy is its largest employer of labour contributing an average of 40% of the total 
intra-African trade. This makes the informal economy integral towards achieving the aims of 
diversifications, structural transformation, reduced poverty and income generation.292 Therefore 
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with respect to the informal economy the following recommendations are made. In the light of the 
fact that the informal economy suffers the deficiency of inadequate data to aid its monitoring and 
lead to the formulation of appropriate policies in the regard, a framework for monitoring should 
be a priority. In addition to devising a monitoring system there should be a strategic framework 
for cross border infrastructures development, capacity building, trade finance and trade facilitation 
with respect to the informal economy. furthermore a framework for more simplified trade rules 
must be created which will be more relatable to the informal trader thereby aiding rather than 
serving as a barrier to small-scale cross border trade activities. 
On a fourth note, more trade would not necessarily lead to development, unless a framework for 
improving the value of what is traded itself is devised. State parties to the AfCFTA must consider 
the upgrading of commodity sectors and develop a priority list of sectors with higher productivity 
for the manufacturing of value added or higher end services. To this end, attention must be given 
to the industrial policy space. There must be a framework for accelerated industrial development 
to run with the framework for trade integration.293 The literature on economic development provide 
apposite proof that the chances of sustainable development are slim, without an industrial policy 
designed to attend to the issues of trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related 
infrastructure, trade finance and trade information and transformation. Therefore, African 
economic players must prepare industrial policy arrangements in that regard. 
Furthermore, the industrial policy for States within the AfCFTA must aspire towards structural 
transformation. This is because the evolving dynamics of continental trade and business will 
impose economic transformation as an imperative for African States to sustainably develop under 
the AfCFTA.294  Transformation within this context is stated to be the utilization of properly 
‘structured’ and ‘targeted’ industrial policy to cause a shift from an economy based on primary 
products and unskilled labor to one driven by knowledge based skilled labor. There has to be a 
shift in the aggregate economic ideology (across the continent) on industrial policy towards 
structural transformation. A responsive industrial policy for transformation (and development) 
requires a balance of forces within States, therefore the need for industrial policy players to have 
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an appreciation of the political economy of industrialization as well as the dynamics surrounding 
this ‘balance’ cannot be over-emphasized. Here, all industrial policy makers must have both a 
theoretical and an empirical knowledge of the industrial policy space in which they operate.  
On a fifth note the importance of strategic monitoring cannot be overemphasized. The policies put 
in place under the AfCFTA will have profound effects on the socio- economic and political space 
of the continent unlike any initiative. This research identified the AfCFTA to be developed with 
very ambitious aspirations, therefore getting it wrong may prove very costly to the pan Africanist 
goals discussed in this research. In the third chapter of the research, the Assembly of heads of 
States and governments, the Council of African Ministers of Trade, the Committee of Senior Trade 
Officials and the AfCFTA Secretariat, were identified as the institutions put in place for monitoring 
the developments of the AfCFTA. Of these bodies, the secretariat, which is established with the 
legal status of a “functionally autonomous institutional body within the AU with an independent 
legal personality” is charged with the most active administrative roles under the provisions of the 
AfCFTA.  
However, what is concerning is not only the absence of a clear operational framework for the 
performance of the monitoring role of the AfCFTA, but also the absence of a stipulation of the 
experience and quality of staff to be employed there. The monitoring of the AfCFTA initiative 
would require individuals from across the continent with a clear understanding of the rudiments of 
economic policy, trade law, regional integration and other related areas and it would be best for 
the AfCFTA to clearly state this. In the absence of this, the AfCFTA must be careful to prevent 
State politics from interfering with appointments to the secretariat, by permitting the employment 
of less qualified personnel in the AfCFTA secretariat. Furthermore, capacity building after 
employment would be an imperative. 
The discussions in this research are by no means new, however they represent ideas more relevant 
to the discourse on African integration now that the continent is at the cusp of its most profound 
leap for development to date. At this point, what is most important is not the ideas themselves but 
how efficiently they are implemented.  
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